Guidance

Country policy and information note: security situation, Yemen, March 2025 (accessible version)

Updated 31 March 2025

Version 1.0, March 2025

Executive summary

The current conflict in Yemen is being fought mainly between the Houthis and the government of Yemen backed by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has been ongoing for the past 10 years.

In April 2022, a truce was agreed between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. This resulted in a de-escalation of violence between the parties and a halt on airstrikes. Although the truce expired in October 2022, the parties have continued to observe its main terms since. The parties have also continued to negotiate a permanent ceasefire.

Despite this, security incidents and conflict-related casualties continue to occur in Yemen. The worst-affected governorates include Al Bayda, Al Hudaydah, Ibb, Saada, and Taiz.

Conflict fatalities represented at least around 1 civilian death for every 100,000 of the population in 2024, indicating the level of indiscriminate violence faced by Yemenis. More than 40% of Yemen’s population have protection needs, meaning they are not ensured safety during the performance of daily activities such that their ability to move freely is constrained and they are deprived of rights to essential services and justice.

A severe security situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

The security situation in Yemen is such that there are not substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable due to restrictions on movement and the risk of ill-treatment at checkpoints.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 18 March 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection

• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm

• if a claim is refused, it is likely to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

Points to note

The names of people and places in this document have been transliterated from Arabic by the sources cited in the Country information. This has resulted in different spellings for the same person, people, or place(s).

In the Assessment section of this CPIN, and any commentary added to the COI, CPIT has used the spelling of place names as they appear in the Map.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.2 Several armed groups operate in Yemen. This includes (but is not limited to): Yemeni government forces, forces of the Southern Transitional Council, and the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah). Some of these groups may be involved in terrorist activities or are responsible for serious human rights abuses and/or war crimes in Yemen. The United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations Security Council apply sanctions and arms embargoes against the Houthis (see UK and international response to Houthis in the Red Sea 2024), and on 22 January 2025, the United States redesignated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (see Designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization).

1.2.3 If there are serious reasons for considering that the person has been involved with the Houthis or (an)other armed group(s), decision makers must consider whether any of the exclusion clauses under Article 1F apply.

1.2.4 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.5 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 A severe security situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

2.1.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general security situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.

2.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Risk of indiscriminate violence

3.1.1 There continues to be an internal armed conflict in Yemen. However, the security situation is such that there are not substantial grounds for believing there is, in general, a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as per paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

3.1.2 Even where there is not a real risk of serious harm due to indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict in general, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm if they are able to show that there are specific reasons over and above simply being a civilian affected by indiscriminate violence.

3.1.3 However, paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules only apply to civilians who must be non-combatants. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

3.1.4 Decision makers must consider each case on its facts.

3.1.5 In the case of Elgafaji (C-465/07), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) set out that

‘– the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances;

‘– the existence of such a threat can exceptionally be considered to be established where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place […] reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to that threat.’ (para 43).

3.1.6 Whilst a country guidance case on Iraq, in QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 620 (24 June 2009), the Upper Tribunal held that ‘We would accept UNHCR’s submission that, for the purposes of article 15(c), there is no requirement that the armed conflict itself must be exceptional. What is, however, required is an intensity of indiscriminate violence – which will self-evidently not characterise every such situation – great enough to meet the test spelt out by the ECJ [in Elgafaji, above]’. (para 36).

3.1.7 As set out below, the levels of indiscriminate violence involving civilians have reduced significantly such that it cannot be said that any remaining levels:

a. reach such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian faces a real risk of serious harm simply by being present; and/or

b. are ‘great enough to meet the test spelt out by the ECJ’ [in Elgafaji].

3.1.8 In 2014, exploiting the political instability that followed the 2011 Arab Spring, the Houthis, an Iran-backed armed group, seized control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, forcing then President Hadi into exile. In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition (SLC) launched a military intervention, aimed at restoring Hadi’s government, marking the start of Yemen’s internal conflict (see Background to the conflict).

3.1.9 Continuing to vie for Yemeni territory are the Houthis, the SLC-backed government of Yemen via a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and other Saudi and Emirati-backed forces including the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group which aims for an independent southern Yemen. While one source describes the conflict as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is officially classified as a non-international armed conflict (see Background to the conflict and Actors).

3.1.10 In April 2022, the UN brokered a truce between the Yemeni government and the Houthis resulting in a de-escalation of violence which included a halt to all airstrikes and major military operations. While the truce formally expired in October 2022, the parties continued to observe its main terms and 2023 saw the lowest level of military activity since 2015. However, from October 2023, the security situation in the Red Sea destabilised. International airstrikes on Houthi military targets within Yemen, in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, began and continued throughout 2024. Fighting between forces continued across Yemen in 2024, though frontlines remained largely static (see General security and recent developments).

3.1.11 Various violent tactics have been employed by the parties to the conflict in Yemen including airstrikes, drone attacks, ground shelling, and the use of landmines, other explosive devices, and live ammunition. Sources indicate that the nature of the violence used in 2023 shifted compared with previous years (see Nature of violence).

3.1.12 Data obtained from ACLED indicated that were 6,103 and 10,957 security events in 2023 and 2024 respectively (see paragraph 9.4.7 for information on how ACLED define different types of security events). The increase in total security event numbers in 2024 was largely due to a 254.3% increase in protests. While there were also slight increases in events coded as ‘Violence against civilians’ (3.2%) and ‘Strategic developments’ (0.7%), there was a decline in events coded as ‘Explosions/remote violence’ (-40.5%), ‘Riots’ (-39.1%) and ‘Battles’ (-37.9%) (see General security and recent developments and Security events and casualty numbers).

3.1.13 ACLED data indicates that across 2023 and 2024 the governorates of Ibb (1,932), Taiz (1,726) and Saada (1,658) had the highest number of security events, with each governorate experiencing higher levels of security events in 2024 than in 2023. The governorates of Socotra (21), Al Mahrah (43) and Hadramaut (232) experienced the lowest numbers of security events across 2023 and 2024. Of the 22 governorates in Yemen, 15 governorates experienced more security events in 2024 than in 2023 (see Security events and casualties by location).

3.1.14 Methodology and figures regarding fatalities vary between sources. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP), there were 1,201 civilian casualties in 2024 (less than 0.1% of the population), including 337 fatalities. These figures are the lowest annual civilian casualty count on CIMP records and represent a 25% decrease in casualties (1,594) and a 33% decrease in fatalities (502) compared to 2023. Using the ‘Civilian targeting’ filter (see paragraph 9.5.5 for information), ACLED data indicates that civilian fatalities (resulting from events in which civilians were the main or only target) decreased from 719 in 2023 to 411 in 2024, marking a 42.8% reduction. Both the CIMP and ACLED fatality figures indicate approximately 1 civilian death for every 100,000 of the population in 2024. It should be noted that due to reporting and data limitations, these figures are likely to be higher in reality (see Security events and casualty numbers and Security events and casualties by location).

3.1.15 Despite differences in figures and methodologies between CIMP and ACLED, both sources state that Al Hudaydah governorate experienced the highest levels of civilian casualties and fatalities in 2024, 69% of which were recorded by CIMP to have resulted from airstrikes. While CIMP did not specify the number of fatalities within its total casualty figures for each governorate, both sources also identified Taiz and Al Bayda as among the top five governorates for civilian casualties and fatalities in 2024 (see Security events and casualties by location).

3.1.16 Landmines and other explosive remnants of warfare (ERW) remain a cause of civilian casualties. According to OCHA, in 2024, 6.9 million people (17.8% of OCHA’s population estimate) would have needs due to mine action. Sources indicate that children are particularly vulnerable to the risks of ERW incidents and OCHA reported that in 2023, landmines and ERW were the largest cause of child casualties in Yemen. Human Rights Watch reported that according to the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), 115 casualties (under 0.1% of the population), of which 49 were fatalities, were caused by landmines and ERW between 1 August 2023 and July 2024. CIMP recorded 260 civilian casualties in 2024, including 84 fatalities, caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance. Sources reported Al Hudaydah to be the worst affected governorate (see Landmines and other explosive remnants of warfare (ERW)).

3.1.17 The UN estimated 16.4 million people to have protection needs (see paragraph 10.1.2 for definition) in 2024 (around 42% of OCHA’s population estimate), including 7.3 million children. The people with the most severe protection needs live in the more densely populated west (see General security and recent developments and Demography).

3.1.18 Areas of territorial control in Yemen fluctuate with military developments. Broadly, most of northwestern Yemen is controlled by the Houthis, much of southwestern Yemen is controlled by the STC and affiliated forces, and most of eastern Yemen is under the control of the Yemen government via the PLC. Sources indicate that between 70% and 80% of Yemen’s population live under the Houthis’ control in around one-third of the country’s territory, including the capital, Sanaa. (see Control of Territory and Houthis).

3.1.19 According to the Global Peace Index, Yemen was ranked the least peaceful country in the world in 2024, worse in comparison to 2023 due to a number of factors including increased violent protests. The judicial system is inoperative in some parts of Yemen and susceptible to interference from political factions and armed groups in others, particularly in Houthi-controlled areas. Yemen’s weak rule of law and order can be seen in incidents of small firearms incidents resulting from economic grievances. OCHA reported that civilian casualties resulting from the breakdown of law and order persisted in 2024 at the same rate as 2023 (see Law and order).

3.1.20 A slowing of year-on-year new conflict-based displacements has occurred since 2020. Sources indicate that in 2023, conflict resulted in around 75,000 new displacements. Available estimates of the number of people in displacement locations in 2023, and during the first six months of 2024, stood at up to 4.5 million (almost 12% of OCHA’s population estimate). While weekly displacements continue to occur for conflict-related reasons, the International Organization for Migration reported 3,678 households (with each household estimated to represent 6 individuals) were displaced at least once in 2024. Sources cite conflict frontline areas as experiencing the highest level of displacement, including Marib, Al Hudaydah, Taiz, and Hajjah. The UNHCR indicated that more than 57% of IDPs have no intention to return to their place of origin (see Displacement).

3.1.21 For guidance on considering serious harm where there is a situation of indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict, including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction, Humanitarian Protection.

4. Protection

4.1.1 The state is not able to provide protection against a breach of Article 3 ECHR because of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict if this occurs in individual cases.

4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable due to restrictions on movement and the risk of ill-treatment at checkpoints.

5.1.2 Yemenis face restrictions on travel due to continuing security incidents, road closures and damage, the presence of landmines, and damage to transport infrastructure. There are reports of travellers being subjected to physical harassment, extortion, theft, or short-term kidnappings for ransom at checkpoints operated by armed tribesmen, sometimes alongside military or other security officials. In 2024, 127 civilian casualties were recorded due to armed violence on vehicles, and the resumption of airstrikes on Yemen caused a significant increase in damage to transport infrastructure (see Freedom of movement).

5.1.3 Freedom of movement is most restricted for those lacking documentation and women, who are expected to be accompanied by a male relative (the ‘mahram’ requirement) while travelling. Sources indicate that the governorates with the greatest restrictions of movement are mostly in northwestern Yemen as well as Al Bayda, Aden, Shabwah and Taiz in southwestern Yemen (see Freedom of movement).

5.1.4 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included covers events up to and including 31 December 2024, though some sources may have been published or made publicly available after this date. Any event taking place after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

7. Geography and demography

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

7.1 Geography

7.1.1 The US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook stated on its undated ‘Yemen’ webpage, updated on 25 November 2024, that Yemen comprises a total of 527,968 square kilometres^{[footnote 1]}, about twice the size of the UK^{[footnote 2]}. Yemen has 1601 kilometres of land borders, 294 with Oman and 1,307 with Saudi Arabia, plus 1,906 kilometres of coastline, along the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea^{[footnote 3]}.

7.1.2 Robert Burrowes and Manfred Wenner in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (EB), updated 14 January 2025, stated:

‘Most of Yemen’s northern frontier with Saudi Arabia traverses the great desert of the peninsula, the Rubʿ al-Khali (“Empty Quarter”), and until 2000 remained undemarcated, as did the eastern frontier with Oman until 1992. Yemen is bounded to the south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea and to the west by the Red Sea. Yemen’s territory includes a number of islands as well …

‘Yemen may be divided into five major regions: a coastal plain running north-south known as the Tihāmah …, the western highlands, the central mountains (the Yemen Highlands), the eastern highlands, and finally the eastern and northeastern desert regions.

‘… Yemen is an arid country, and there are no permanent watercourses.’^{[footnote 4]}

7.1.3 On its undated ‘Maps of Yemen’ webpage, which was updated on 7 December 2022, WorldAtlas, a cartographer-created geography resource^{[footnote 5]}, stated:

‘Yemen (officially the Republic of Yemen) is divided into two main administrative divisions. They are known as Governorates … and Districts … Governorates constitute the highest administrative division in Yemen. There are 22 governorates including the capital city - Amanat al Άsmiah (Sanaa City) …

‘… The 22 governorates are further subdivided into 333 districts and smaller subdivisions including 2,210 sub-districts and 38,284 villages.

‘Sana´a is the largest city in Yemen and the capital of the country.’^{[footnote 6]}

7.1.4 OnTheWorldMap.com published the following 2021 map of Yemen, showing its 22 governorates and their capitals^{[footnote 7]}: map of Yemen

7.2 Demography

7.2.1 The US CIA World Factbook estimated the population of Yemen in 2024 to be a little over 32 million^{[footnote 8]}, while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA’s) estimated it to be 38.7 million^{[footnote 9]}. By comparison, the population of the United Kingdom, estimated in 2024 at just under 68.5 million^{[footnote 10]}, is around double the population of Yemen.

7.2.2 Based on its 2024 population estimate, the US CIA World Factbook noted, that 34.4% of Yemenis were estimated to be aged 0 to 14 years, 62.2% aged 15 to 64 years, and 3.4% aged 65 years or over, with a median age of 22 years^{[footnote 11]}.

7.2.3 Yemen’s population was stated, by the same source, to be mainly concentrated in the Asir Mountains, part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system, located in the far western region of Yemen^{[footnote 12]}.

7.2.4 Cartograf.fr, a geography and maps information site^{[footnote 13]}, published the below undated map, showing population distribution across Yemen^{[footnote 14]}:

[Population distribution across Yemen[(https://www.cartograf.fr/pays/img/yemen/carte_yemen_densite_population.png)

8. Background to the conflict

8.1.1 On 15 October 2024, the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS), a Moroccan think tank^{[footnote 15]}, published a report entitled ‘Yemen’s Path to Stability: Evaluating the Presidential Leadership Council’s Role and Impact’, which cited various sources. The report stated:

‘Yemen’s contemporary conflict has its roots in the political upheaval that began during the Arab Spring in 2011. The uprising led to the resignation of long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was succeeded by his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in a transfer of power intended to stabilize the country. However, the political transition failed to address the deep-seated issues within Yemen, including widespread poverty, corruption, and the marginalization of various groups.

‘In 2014, the Houthi movement, a Zaidi [an Islamic sect^{[footnote 16]}] Shia [the smaller of the two major branches of Islam, the other being Sunnism^{[footnote 17]}] group officially known as Ansar Allah, capitalized on the political instability. The Houthis, advanced from their northern stronghold of Saada, eventually seizing control of the capital, Sana’a, in September 2014. By early 2015, they had forced President Hadi to flee to Aden and subsequently to Saudi Arabia.

‘…In March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition launched a military intervention aimed at restoring Hadi’s government. The rapid expansion of Houthi control and their initial alignment with former President Saleh, a Zaidi himself who retained significant influence and military support, alarmed regional powers. However, this alliance was short-lived. Tensions between the Houthis and Saleh grew as both sides sought to assert dominance over the political and military landscape in Yemen. Saleh, who had ruled Yemen for decades, viewed the Houthis as potential tools to regain power, while the Houthis saw Saleh as a means to bolster their military strength.

‘In 2017, this fragile partnership unraveled when Saleh attempted to negotiate with the Saudi-led coalition in an effort to end the conflict, a move the Houthis saw as a betrayal. In response, the Houthis turned against Saleh, ultimately leading to his death in December 2017 during clashes with militia’s forces. This marked a critical turning point in the war, deepening the conflict and further complicating efforts to achieve peace.

‘Amidst this ongoing conflict, various peace talks, and ceasefire agreements have been attempted, but lasting peace has remained elusive.’^{[footnote 18]}

8.1.2 In October 2022, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), a Washington DC-based non-profit organisation that focuses on advocating for the protection of civilians before, during and after armed conflict^{[footnote 19]}, published a report entitled ‘Risking the Future: Climate Change, Environmental Destruction, and Conflict in Yemen’. The report, which cited various sources, stated:

‘The war in Yemen is a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the government of Yemen and the Houthis. The Houthis began vying for power against the government in 2004, and eventually took control of the capital, Sana’a, in 2014, sparking the current conflict. Since then, they have taken control of significant swaths of territory in Yemen, mostly in the north of the country. Though the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) entered the conflict in March of 2015 and has since played a significant role, their involvement has been at the request of the Yemeni government, meaning that the conflict continues to be classified as a NIAC. Further, though Iran supports the Houthis, there is not enough evidence to show that it has effective control over the group - a requirement for the conflict to be considered an international armed conflict (IAC).’^{[footnote 20]}

8.1.3 On 20 April 2023, The Guardian newspaper published an article which stated: ‘In recent years, the conflict has turned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran…’^{[footnote 21]}

8.1.4 On 18 July 2024, Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana), an independent Yemeni organisation that advocates for human rights via the verification and documentation of human rights violations^{[footnote 22]}, published its annual report on the human rights situation in Yemen. Entitled ‘Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023’ (the Mwatana report), the report, which cited various sources, stated: ‘In accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the principles of international humanitarian law, which distinguish between international and non-international armed conflicts, the conflict in Yemen is classified as a non-international armed conflict.’^{[footnote 23]}

9. Actors

9.1 Internationally Recognised Government (IRG)

9.1.1 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO), a platform that ‘combines data-driven analysis with robust qualitative assessments of political violence and disorder to enable greater awareness of how the security situation is evolving’^{[footnote 24]}, provided profiles for the actors in the Yemen conflict. About the IRG, it stated:

‘The Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) refers to the institutions of the Yemeni state that are recognized by the international community. The IRG is based in the interim capital of Aden since February 2015, when President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi fled Yemen’s capital Sanaa, after it was overrun by forces of the Houthi-Saleh alliance in late 2014. It is currently led by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chaired by former Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi … Significant political differences exist among the members of the PLC, including the future shape of the Yemeni state and its international alliances. IRG military forces are commanded by Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz and are present in the governorates of former southern Yemen [which was composed of Abyan, Aden, parts of Dahle, Al Mahrah, Hadramaut, Lahij, Shabwa, and Suqutra^{[footnote 25]}] as well as the governorates of al-Jawf, Hajjah, Marib, Saada, and Taizz.’^{[footnote 26]}

9.1.2 On 29 February 2024, Freedom House published ‘Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen’, covering events of 2023, which stated:

‘… Presidential and legislative elections are now many years overdue, and no side in the civil war has been willing or able to implement any electoral framework in the areas under their control … Yemen has no functioning central government with full control over its territory, and any state institutions that continue to operate are controlled by unelected officials and armed groups. The PLC established in 2022 is largely dependent on its foreign patrons, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which also have parallel relationships with other anti-Houthi groups.’^{[footnote 27]} CPIT noted there were no reports of forthcoming elections in the more recent sources consulted.

9.1.3 The Mwatana report, covering 2023, stated: ‘… [T]he internationally recognized government forces … receive financial and logistical support, as well as most of their orders, from Saudi Arabia.’^{[footnote 28]}

9.1.4 The 15 October 2024 PCNS report stated: ‘There has been continued engagement in parallel diplomatic efforts, often directly with international actors, bypassing the PLC. This independent approach to negotiations undermines the Council’s position as the central authority in Yemen … [T]he Presidential Leadership Council exercises control primarily over less populated regions of Yemen …’^{[footnote 29]}

9.1.5 On 12 December 2024, the USSD published ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Yemen’ (the USSD 2023 terrorism report), covering 2023, which stated: ‘The ROYG [the internationally recognised Republic of Yemen government] controlled about two thirds of Yemen’s territory …’^{[footnote 30]} CPIT noted that the USSD 2022 terrorism report, similarly, reported: ‘The ROYG controlled about two thirds of the country’s territory, but only 30 percent of the country’s population.’^{[footnote 31]}

9.1.6 The ‘Yemen’ entry in the CIA World Factbook, updated on 22 December 2024, noted that while information was limited and varied widely, up to 300,000 military, paramilitary, militia, and other security forces were estimated to be under the ROYG in 2022^{[footnote 32]}. See the CIA World Factbook for which forces were considered to collectively comprise the ‘ROYG forces’.

9.2 Saudi-led Coalition (SLC)

9.2.1 The ACLED YCO stated:

‘In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of other Arab allies launched a military intervention to restore the authority of Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was earlier ousted by the Houthis. Codenamed Operation Decisive Storm and Operation Restoring Hope beginning in April 2015, the intervention largely consisted of air and naval operations in support of the Yemeni government and resistance troops. In addition, Saudi, Emirati, and Sudanese special forces spearheaded ground offensives in Aden, Mukalla, and along Yemen’s western coast and northern border. Fissures within what became known as the Saudi-led Coalition hampered its unity. Qatar was suspended from the Coalition in 2017 in the wake of the diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In turn, Saudi and Emirati strategic interests have increasingly diverged, with Saudi Arabia throwing its weight behind Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the UAE supporting the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC).’^{[footnote 33]}

9.2.2 The 15 October 2024 PCNS report stated: ‘Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen is driven by its concerns over regional security and the influence of its rival, Iran … For Saudi Arabia, the rise of the Houthis on its southern border posed a direct threat to its national security … [Their] intervention was part of a broader strategy to prevent Iran from gaining a foothold in Yemen, which could allow Tehran to exert influence in the region.’^{[footnote 34]}

9.2.3 The CIVIC October 2022 report stated: ‘When the Saudi-led Coalition first entered the conflict, it included Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, the coalition operates with very little transparency, and at this point it is unclear which states remain involved.’^{[footnote 35]}

9.2.4 On 4 February 2024, Al Jazeera, a media outlet under the ownership of a media conglomerate and the Qatari government^{[footnote 36]}, published an article which stated: ‘For now, the Saudis seem committed to ceasefire negotiations with the Houthis since a truce was announced in April 2022.’^{[footnote 37]}

9.2.5 The Freedom in the World 2024 report stated: ‘Saudi and Emirati military forces have occupied several strategic portions of Yemeni territory during the war, including Al-Mahrah Governorate and the island of Socotra, respectively.’^{[footnote 38]}

9.2.6 The ‘Yemen’ entry in the CIA World Factbook, updated on 22 December 2024, noted that while information was limited and varied widely, up to 150-200,000 trained militia and paramilitary fighters were estimated to be under the UAE- and Saudi-backed forces in 2022^{[footnote 39]}. CPIT noted that the entry did not break down how many of those were under each of the groups of forces. See the CIA World Factbook for which groups were considered to comprise the UAE- and the Saudi-backed forces.

9.3 Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah)

9.3.1 The ACLED YCO stated:

‘The Houthis – also known as Ansar Allah – are a Zaydi Shiite politico-religious movement founded by Husayn al-Houthi. Under the leadership of Husayn’s brother, Abdulmalik, the Houthis currently rule over Sanaa and Yemen’s northwestern provinces, governing more than 70% of the country’s population. The Houthis seized a substantial portion of Yemen’s national arms stockpile and integrated loyal military units into their military architecture. Moreover, they acquired advanced drone and missile technology from Iran. They have a national agenda aimed at freeing Yemen from perceived “foreign aggression” and reviving its “faith identity.” At the regional level, they are self-proclaimed members of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, embracing its anti-imperialist rhetoric and agenda to support the liberation of Palestinian land.’^{[footnote 40]}

9.3.2 On 12 January 2024, Al Jazeera published an article entitled ‘Who are the Houthis? A simple guide to the Yemeni group’ which stated:

‘The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, causing it to step down and sparking a crippling humanitarian crisis. The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks. However, analysts say the Shia group should not be seen as an Iranian proxy. It has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

‘… [Houthi] attacks [in the Red Sea], and the response from major powers like the US, also force other countries and governments to negotiate with them, giving them de facto legitimacy at a time when they are not officially recognised internationally as Yemen’s government.’^{[footnote 41]}

9.3.3 The ‘Yemen’ entry in the CIA World Factbook, updated on 22 December 2024, noted that while information was limited and varied widely, the Houthis were estimated to have 200,000 fighters in 2022^{[footnote 42]}.

9.3.4 On 23 February 2024, Al Jazeera published an article which, citing various sources, stated:

‘The Houthis have recruited and trained more than 200,000 new fighters since the group began its actions in the Red Sea [in November 2023] in support of Palestine, a Houthi spokesperson says … Based on his research, al-Iryani [Abdulghani al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies] put the estimate of new Houthi fighters at close to 150,000 as of February 12 [2024] … Al Jazeera’s Sanad verification team said about 37,000 fighters had been recruited since … US air strikes began [in January 2024] alone.’^{[footnote 43]}

9.3.5 On 1 March 2024, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a US-based membership organisation, think-tank and educator, with a stated aim of informing US engagement with the world^{[footnote 44]}, published an article entitled ‘Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know,’. The article, which cited various sources, stated: ‘The Houthis’ government, based in the capital, Sanaa, is recognized only by Iran … Militant groups allied with Iran are frequently called Tehran’s proxies, but many experts say the Houthis are better characterized as Iran’s willing partner. Iran is the Houthis’ primary benefactor, providing them mostly with security assistance, such as weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support.’^{[footnote 45]}

9.3.6 On 26 June 2024, the US Department of State (USSD) published its ‘2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Yemen’, covering events of 2023, which stated: ‘During the year [2023], the Houthis continued to control approximately one-third of the country’s territory, including 70 to 80 percent of the population.’^{[footnote 46]}

9.4 Southern Transitional Council (STC)

9.4.1 The ACLED YCO stated:

‘The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is a United Arab Emirates-backed secessionist political organization founded and led by Aydarus al-Zubaydi. Established in May 2017, the STC aligned with the anti-Houthi camp, though engaging in political and military competition with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). Despite joining the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022, the STC claims to represent the will and interests of the southerners, it advocates for the south’s peaceful secession, and it firmly opposes the Islamist Islah party. STC President Zubaydi is also the supreme commander of the Southern Armed Forces, which include several military brigades and police forces integrated into the IRG’s defense and interior ministries.’^{[footnote 47]}

9.4.2 On 23 April 2024, Amnesty International (AI) published its annual report entitled ‘The State of the World’s Human Rights’, covering 2023 (referred to herein as the ‘2023 Human Rights report’), which stated: ‘… Security Belt forces … [are] a paramilitary wing of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) that controls parts of south Yemen …’^{[footnote 48]}

9.4.3 On 26 August 2024, The New Arab (TNA), a London-based, English-language news and current affairs website, and part of Fadaat Media^{[footnote 49]}, a Qatari-established media group^{[footnote 50]}, published an article entitled ‘The STC struggles to define its future in a fragmented Yemen’. The article stated: ‘… [T]he seven-seat body [of the PLC] includes three representatives from the Southern Transitional Council (STC) … “It is important to understand that the STC, regardless of their claim to represent all Southerners, are not uncontested in the South …” [said Dr Jens Heibach, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, to TNA]’^{[footnote 51]}

9.4.4 The Mwatana report, covering 2023, stated: ‘Since … [2019] the Southern Transitional Council and its armed formations, known as the Security Belt and Elite Forces, have held de-facto control of most of the southern regions, directly influencing government headquarters, government agencies, and local communities … [T]he Southern Transitional Council, with its various formations, receive[s] financial and logistical support, as well as most of their orders, from the UAE.’^{[footnote 52]}

9.4.5 The ACLED YCO stated:

‘Founded in 2016, [the Elite Forces] are trained, supplied, and financed by the United Arab Emirates. While officially under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, the Elite Forces are reported to fall under the operational command of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The Elite Forces are organized based on territorial criteria and lack a unitary command. The Shabwani Elite Forces (SEF), which at their peak counted around 7,000 fighters in their ranks, were gradually disbanded between 2020 and 2021. The Hadrami Elite Forces (HEF) comprise three brigades, and continue to operate under Major General Faiz Mansur al-Tamimi. There have been reports of other Elite Forces in Mahra and Suqutra, but they remain inactive at the time of writing.

‘… Founded in 2016, [the Security Belt Forces (SBF)] are trained, supplied, and financed by the United Arab Emirates. While formally placed under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, they are reported to respond to the operational command of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). They are led by Brigadier Muhsin al-Wali and consist of approximately 15,000 fighters organized in four territorial units: Abyan, al-Dali, Lahij, and Aden.’^{[footnote 53]}

9.4.6 For information about the estimated size of the UAE-backed forces in Yemen, see paragraph 8.2.6. See the CIA World Factbook for which forces were considered to collectively comprise the STC forces.

9.5 Joint Forces on the West Coast

9.5.1 The ACLED YCO stated:

‘The Joint Forces on the West Coast – previously known as National Resistance – bring together three armed militias: the Guards of the Republic, the Southern Giants Brigades, and the Tihama Resistance. They number approximately 40,000 fighters. The Joint Forces were established in July 2019 with support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Major General Haytham Qasim Tahir serves as the general commander of the Joint Forces, although Tariq Saleh is reported to be the actual decision-maker. The Joint Forces have a national agenda aimed at freeing Yemen’s West Coast and the northern governorates from the Houthis … The Joint Forces are backed by the UAE, but they are not entirely subordinated to the … STC …’^{[footnote 54]}

9.5.2 On 22 March 2023, the Modern Insurgent, an independent media organisation which focuses on insurgencies, rebel organisations, and political movements, particularly those it considers to be under-reported^{[footnote 55]}, published an article entitled ‘Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF)’. The article, which cited various sources, stated:

‘… [T]he components of the NRF control regions in southeast Yemen and operate independently of the Hadi forces … As a member within the anti-Houthi camp, the NRF does technically constitute a piece of the internationally-recognized Hadi government. However, given the fragmented nature of Yemeni politics, many regions under NRF control are essentially proto-states. Although the Giants Brigade, Guardians of the Republic, and Tihama Resistance fight under the SLC, they enjoy extensive autonomy within the regions their respective troops occupy in the country’s southwest corner.’^{[footnote 56]}

9.6 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

9.6.1 The ACLED YCO, citing various sources, stated:

‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda. It is a Sunni Islamist rebel group that was established in 2009 and is currently led by Emir Khalid Batarfi. Al-Qaeda’s goal is to replace “apostate” Islamic regimes with regimes inspired by “true” Islamic values while targeting the United States and its allies, which are viewed as responsible for the corruption within these regimes. AQAP shares this goal, but in the past the group has also targeted the Yemeni regime directly for territorial control. Today, AQAP’s operational presence is stronger in Abyan and Shabwa governorates. The group is also active in Hadramawt, Marib, and al-Bayda governorates, with reported sleeper cells in al-Mahra, Aden, and Lahij. AQAP is estimated to have between 3,000 to 4,000 members including both active and passive elements.’^{[footnote 57]}

9.6.2 The USSD 2023 terrorism report noted: ‘AQAP remained active most notably in al-Bayda, Abyan, Shabwah, Ta’izz, and Ma’rib governorates.’^{[footnote 58]}

9.7 Islamic State in Yemen (ISY)

9.7.1 The ACLED YCO, citing various sources, stated:

‘The Islamic State in Yemen (ISY) is the actor that represents the Yemeni province of the global caliphate claimed by the self-styled Islamic State (IS). IS aspires to replace “apostate” Islamic regimes with ones inspired by “true” Islamic values and it aims to establish local territorial control. In Yemen, the Sunni Islamist rebel group was established in November 2014. ISY’s primary goal is to fight the Houthis, which are from the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam. As of September 2023, ISY is estimated to have around 100 fighters, with safe havens reported in Marib and Shabwa governorates, and sleeper cells in Aden and al-Bayda. Its activity has drastically decreased since 2021, with its role in Yemen’s conflict environment being at best marginal.’^{[footnote 59]}

1.1.1. The USSD 2023 terrorism report noted: ‘ISIS-Yemen was considerably smaller in size and influence, compared with AQAP, but remained active.’^{[footnote 60]}

Back to Contents

10. Security situation 2022-2024

10.1 General security and recent developments

10.1.1 On 1 February 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published a report entitled ‘Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024)’. The report, which cited various sources including primary data gathered in 2023, included the below graphic showing the numbers of people it estimated would have protection needs in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location^{[footnote 61]}:

People in need	16.4 million
Women	24%
Girls	25%
Men	24%
Boys	26%
With disability	15%

10.1.2 A Technical Manual published in July 2024 by the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF), a partnership of donors, United Nations agencies, NGOs, global clusters and other stakeholders which sets the standards for the analysis and estimation of humanitarian needs^{[footnote 62]}, defined people with protection needs as:

‘Individuals, across all population groups and considering their age, gender, and diversity, exposed to protection risks in the areas affected:

‘1. whose safety constraints limit their ability to move freely and access public spaces

‘2. who cannot perform practices that ensure physical, emotional, psychological, and social safety, such as social interaction, educational pursuits, economic engagement, and healthcare, and

‘3. who are deprived of their rights, including adequate access to essential services and justice, considering their age, gender, and diverse needs.’^{[footnote 63]}

10.1.3 OCHA published an updated Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) 2025 on 15 January 2025, from which country information has also been cited within this CPIN. CPIT noted that in its updated HNRP, OCHA provided estimated numbers of people in need, including by sector-specific needs, for 2025. It was further noted that where OCHA provided estimated numbers of people in need, including by sector-specific needs, for 2024 in its 2025 HNRP, these were unchanged from the estimated numbers that OCHA provided in its Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024. As the country information within this CPIN relates to events up to 31 December 2024 (see About the country information for details), and as OCHA does not appear to have revised its 2024 estimated numbers in retrospect, CPIT has quoted the OCHA 2024 estimated figures from the Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 despite the publication of the 2025 HNRP. CPIT deemed this particularly helpful due to the OCHA graphics for the 2024 estimated numbers included throughout this CPIN, which were provided in the Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 but not the 2025 HNRP (which provided many of the equivalent graphics for 2025 estimated numbers only).

10.1.4 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs also published the below graphic showing the numbers of children with protection needs, and the severity of those needs, by location^{[footnote 64]}:

People in need	7.3 million
Boys	51%
Girls	49%
With disability	15%

10.1.5 In January 2024, the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP), a service under the United Nations Protection Cluster for Yemen which monitors the civilian impact of armed violence in Yemen with the purpose of informing and complementing protection programming^{[footnote 65]}, published its ‘2023 Annual Report’ on the direct impact of armed violence on civilians in Yemen, covering the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023 (the CIMP 2023 annual report). The report stated:

‘At the start of April 2022, a UN-mediated countrywide truce entered into force, driving a de-escalation on the country’s main frontlines, fixing them in place, and bringing a halt to airstrikes. Despite the truce officially lapsing in October 2022, the truce unofficially held across Yemen’s frontlines throughout 2023. Frontline activity was concentrated in southern Hudaydah, Ma’rib, Ta’izz and Dali’, primarily characterised by artillery exchanges, intermittent drone attacks, and limited skirmishes. There were no significant frontline shifts in 2023.

‘… From October 2023, the security situation in the Red Sea began destabilising. As of the end of 2023, this had not translated into a direct impact on civilians on the west coast [of Yemen].’^{[footnote 66]}

10.1.6 The 12 January 2024 Al Jazeera article stated:

‘The Houthis have been engaging in Omani-mediated talks with Saudi officials to negotiate a permanent ceasefire. Saudi Arabia also restored relations with Iran in 2023, raising hopes for the Yemen peace process.

‘… The UN announced in late December [2023] that serious progress was made in negotiations, but experts warned that Houthi activity in the Red Sea could derail a final deal…

‘… In recent weeks the Houthis have deployed 50,000 troops around Marib, the internationally recognised Yemeni government’s last stronghold.’^{[footnote 67]}

10.1.7 The 4 February 2024 Al Jazeera article stated:

‘“The Marib front is one of the fronts that flares up from time to time since the UN truce was declared in April 2022,” Faozi al-Goidi, a junior visiting fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera … It is unclear if the Houthis are planning another offensive on Marib …

‘The Houthis and Saudi Arabia are currently engaging in ceasefire talks after a grinding civil war that lasted nearly a decade. Both have seemed committed to a deal, with analysts saying Houthis actions in the Red Sea and domestically are part of a strategy to negotiate better terms.’^{[footnote 68]}

10.1.8 The Freedom in the World 2023 report stated:

‘Saudi-led coalition air strikes regularly failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and artillery fire from Houthi forces has been similarly indiscriminate. Other armed factions, including foreign military units and extremist groups like AQAP, operate with impunity for any abuses …

‘However, military activity declined in 2023 to its lowest level since the civil war began in 2015.

‘… The Houthis began a campaign of attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea in November [2023], ostensibly to punish Israel and its partners for the invasion of Gaza. While a US-led coalition launched limited air strikes against Houthi positions in response, Yemeni civilians overall experienced greater physical security during the year [2023] as a result of the reduction in fighting since 2022.’^{[footnote 69]}

10.1.9 The Mwatana report, covering 2023, also noted a marked decrease in military operations and clashes, particularly airstrikes by the Saudi / UAE-led coalition, since April 2022. However, it also noted that sporadic clashes at various levels occurred during 2023 in ‘many governorates’, including Shabwah, Al Hudaydah, and Al Bayda where it said battles occurred in around 30% of the governorate. The report also noted there were conflict zones in Al Hudaydah and Taiz, a significant rise in drone attacks in Al Bayda, Al Hudaydah, Taiz, Marib, and other regions, and an increase in incidents involving mines and explosive devices^{[footnote 70]}.

10.1.10 For more information about the clashes and conflict zones mentioned above, namely for details of which districts they occurred in, between which parties, and the range of consequences for civilians, see pages 24 to 25 of the Mwatana report.

10.1.11 On 4 October 2024, BBC News published an article which stated:

‘The US military says it has launched strikes on the Iranian-backed Houthi group in Yemen, hitting 15 targets.

‘… Several explosions were reported in some of Yemen’s main cities, including the capital Sanaa.

‘… Central Command, which oversees US military operations in the Middle East, said the attacks targeted weapons systems, bases and other equipment belonging to the Houthis.

‘… Last week the Pentagon said the Houthis had launched “a complex attack” on US Navy ships in the region, though all of the weapons launched were shot down.

‘… As well as the attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Houthis have fired several missiles and drones at Israel directly.

‘… Israel responded by attacking sites in Yemen.

‘Earlier this year [2024], the US, UK and 12 other nations launched Operation Prosperity Guardian [a multinational naval coalition of at least 20 countries as of late December 2023^{[footnote 71]}] to protect Red Sea shipping lanes against the Houthis.’^{[footnote 72]}

10.1.12 The 15 October 2024 PCNS report stated:

‘Recent negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have gained momentum following the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran’s influence has significantly curbed Houthi hostilities towards Saudi Arabia, leading to promising developments despite ongoing obstacles.

‘… Even if Saudi Arabia manages to secure an agreement with the Houthis, this will not resolve Yemen’s internal conflicts. The Southern Transitional Council remains steadfast in its secessionist ambitions for the south, which is fundamentally opposed by the Houthis, who advocate for a unified Yemen. Consequently, the potential for renewed hostilities between the STC and the Houthis remains high. At this point a successful agreement between the Houthi’s and the PLC seems unlikely due to the STC’s opposing stance on the unification of Yemen.’^{[footnote 73]}

10.1.13 On 16 October 2024, the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (Sana’a Center), an independent think-tank which operates in, and focuses on, Yemen^{[footnote 74]}, published a report entitled ‘The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024’ in which it stated:

‘Fighting between Houthi and pro-government forces continued across Yemen, though frontlines have remained largely static. The Karesh front between Taiz and Lahj has seen consistent action, along with central Al-Dhalea, southern Hudaydah, and Marib. Battles in Lahj and Marib saw Houthi forces capture several positions before Emirati-backed forces retook them. Fighting in Hudaydah halted in early September [2024] as flooding destroyed earthworks and weapons caches. Al-Qaeda detonated a car bomb at a Southern Transitional Council (STC) affiliated base in Abyan, killing 16 soldiers.’^{[footnote 75]}

10.1.14 On 25 October 2024, the World Bank Group updated its webpage, ‘The World Bank in Yemen’. It stated: ‘The truce reached between the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the Houthis in April 2022 has not yet translated into a peace settlement, despite the announcement of a Roadmap in December 2023. Heightened regional tensions and attacks on Red Sea shipping by the Houthis have further complicated peace process efforts.’^{[footnote 76]}

10.1.15 In January 2025, CIMP published its ‘2024 Annual Report’ (the CIMP 2024 Annual report) on the direct impact of armed violence on civilians in Yemen, covering the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024. The report stated: ‘Airstrikes resumed on Yemen in 2024 for the first time since before the 2022 truce commenced. The frontlines in central Yemen remained static in 2024, but limited shellfire, drone activity and incursions continued along the frontlines.’^{[footnote 77]}

1.1.2. In February 2025, the Sana’a Center published ‘The Yemen Review Quarterly: October-December 2024’, which stated: ‘… [T]he US and UK continue to periodically target Houthi armories and missile silos. Both the Houthis and pro-government forces sent significant military reinforcements to Hudaydah in expectation of a resumption of intense fighting… There was also military buildup in Al-Dhalea and Lahj, where clashes occurred almost daily. Fighting picked up to the north and west of Taiz city in October and November [2024] …’^{[footnote 78]}

10.2 Control of territory

10.2.1 The 15 October 2024 PCNS report, citing an August 2023 article in The Economist (available via subscription only), published the below map of Yemen, showing areas of control in August 2023^{[footnote 79]}:

[Map shows Houthis control the west, the centre is split with Islah, PLC and allies in control to the north and STC and allies in control to the south. The eastern portion of the centre is unclear and the far east bordering Oman is controlled by Isla, PLC and allies]

10.2.2 The ACLED YCO published an interactive regional profiles map (last updated on 31 January 2024 at the time of writing) that provides an in-depth look at the territorial control within each region of Yemen.

10.2.3 The 16 October 2024 Sana’a Center report published the following map of Yemen, showing various actors’ zones of control between 1 July and 30 September 2024^{[footnote 80]}: Yemen zones of control (page 22)

10.2.4 In January 2025, the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX), an open platform for sharing humanitarian datasets which is managed by OCHA’s Centre for Humanitarian Data^{[footnote 81]}, published the below map produced by ACAPS, an independent organisation that specialises in ‘humanitarian needs analysis and assessment’^{[footnote 82]}, showing areas of control in Yemen as of 24 October 2024. It should be noted that the areas labelled ‘De-facto authority’ refer to areas controlled by Houthi forces^{[footnote 83]}:

Areas of control in Yemen

10.3 Nature of violence

10.3.1 The Mwatana report, covering 2023, stated:

‘Since the outbreak of armed conflict in Yemen in September 2014, parties to the conflict have continuously committed various types of direct violations against Yemeni civilians. These include killing and maiming through various means such as ground and aerial attacks, live ammunition, landmines, explosive devices, and military vehicle collisions [also drone strikes, stabbings, beatings, and other forms of assault on civilians^{[footnote 84]}]. Other violations include … attacks on vital infrastructure including schools and hospitals…

‘… The overall level of violations and resulting casualties [in 2023] remained consistent with previous years, signaling the continuation of transgressions at the same intensity despite the reduction in significant military offensives. This highlights the emergence of new violation tactics…’^{[footnote 85]}

10.3.2 See paragraphs 10.4.7 to 10.4.10 for recent data showing the number of security and events and fatalities caused by the different types of violence used in the conflict in 2023 and 2024.

10.4 Security events and casualty numbers

10.4.1 The Freedom in the World 2024 report stated: ‘According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), by the end of 2023, more than 160,000 people had been killed in the conflict.’^{[footnote 86]}

10.4.2 Citing CIMP data, the OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report published the below graph, showing the number of incidents impacting civilians, and the number of civilian fatalities and injuries in Yemen from the start of the UN-brokered truce, on 2 April 2022, until the end of the third quarter of 2023^{[footnote 87]}:

	Incidents impacting civilians (approximate)	Civilian fatalities	Civilian injuries
Q1 2022	500	352	743
Q2 2022	340	159	298
Q3 2022	360	129	350
Q4 2022	300	129	336
Q1 2023	340	140	441
Q2 2023	290	136	282
Q3 2023	275	122	228

10.4.3 The CIMP 2023 Annual Report stated:

‘1,675 civilian casualties were reported in Yemen as a direct result of armed violence in 2023. This marks a 33% decrease in casualty numbers compared to 2022, and is the lowest annual civilian casualty count on CIMP records, since the project commenced in 2018. 30% (502) of the casualties were fatalities; a similar proportion to 2022, when 31% of the casualties reported were fatalities. January 2023 saw the highest monthly casualty count in 2023, at 237, the highest monthly casualty count seen in a year, since January 2022. Moreover, the monthly average casualty count during the first quarter of 2023 was 194, the highest monthly average seen since the first quarter of 2022, before the countrywide truce entered into force and airstrikes ceased. Monthly casualty numbers saw a gradual decrease through 2023, however, with the monthly average dropping to 122 civilian casualties for the remainder of the year. June saw the lowest number of civilian casualties, at 89.

‘There were 12 incidents in which 10 or more civilians were killed or injured. In two of those incidents, more than 20 civilian casualties were reported. By contrast, 2022 saw 27 mass casualty incidents.’^{[footnote 88]}

10.4.4 The CIMP 2024 Annual report stated:

‘In 2024, armed violence in Yemen was directly responsible for a reported 1,201 civilian casualties, including 337 fatalities. This is the lowest annual civilian casualty count on CIMP records, marking a 25% decrease compared to the 1,594 civilian casualties reported in 2023, and a 24% decrease in fatality numbers [CPIT noted the decrease to be 33% based on the 502 fatalities that CIMP reported in 2023, see paragraph 9.4.3]. In line with previous years, just under a third (28%) of the casualties were fatalities, the same percentage as 2023, when 443 fatalities were reported. While 2023 saw a gradual decrease in civilian casualty numbers on a month-to-month basis, numbers were more erratic in 2024, the fluctuations driven largely by mass casualty incidents, the majority of which were on account of airstrikes. For example, July 2024 saw 161 civilian casualties reported, the highest since May 2023, while October 2024 saw the lowest monthly casualty count on CIMP records, at 39.

‘Despite the decrease in overall figures, there were more mass casualty incidents reported. There were 16 incidents in which 10 or more civilians were killed or injured, and in five of these, more than 30 civilian casualties were reported. By contrast, in 2023, 12 incidents saw 10 or more civilian casualties, and only one incident saw as many as 30 casualties. Of the five incidents to see the highest casualty numbers in 2024, four were the result of airstrikes.’^{[footnote 89]}

10.4.5 Regarding methodology, CIMP stated:

‘CIMP collects data via systematic, open source information on all incidents of armed violence. The data is filtered by the CIMP team in order to evaluate incidents with possible civilian impact. Those incidents are then further researched and cross-referenced via multiple sources and graded based on their level of credibility … As CIMP aims to collect and disseminate data on civilian impact that occurs as a result of armed conflict, some incidents are excluded from the dataset. This includes incidents related to crime, domestic violence and small arms fire incidents that occur away from areas of active conflict and have fewer than two casualties.’^{[footnote 90]}

10.4.6 For information regarding CIMP methodology, see page 3 of the 2024 Annual Report.

10.4.7 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) provided the following definitions for the different types of security events it collected data on:

‘Battles: Violent interactions between two organized armed groups;

‘Explosions/Remote violence: An event involving one side using remote weapons (e.g. artillery). These events can be against other armed actors, or used against civilians;

‘Violence against civilians: Violent events where an organized armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants;

‘Protests: Public demonstrations in which the participants are not violent;

‘Riots: Violent events where demonstrators or mobs engage in destructive acts against property and/or disorganized acts of violence against people;

‘Strategic developments: Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder. These can include recruitment drives, incidents of looting, and arrests are some examples of what may be included under this event type. Note that strategic developments are coded differently from other event types, and hence users must remember that they should be used differently from other event types in analysis.’^{[footnote 91]}

10.4.8 The following table was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool on 30 January 2025. The data shows the numbers of the different types of security events in 2023 and 2024 and their associated fatalities. It should be noted that the fatalities data below does not distinguish between civilians and combatants^{[footnote 92]}:

Type of security event	Events 2023	Events 2024	Events Total	Fatalities 2023	Fatalities 2024	Fatalities Total
Battles	987	613	1,600	1,172	1,197	2,369
Explosions / remote violence	1,402	835	2,237	634	337	971
Violence against civilians	681	703	1,384	287	247	534
Protests	2,278	8,071	10,349	0	6	6
Riots	64	39	103	17	1	18
Strategic developments	691	696	1,387	38	26	64
Total	6,103	10,957	17,060	2,148	1,814	3,962

10.4.9 The data shows an overall increase in security events from 2023 to 2024, mainly as a result of a large increase in Protests (+254.3%). Violence against civilians and Strategic developments saw smaller increases of 3.2% and 0.7%, respectively. In contrast, Explosions/remote violence, Riots and Battles all saw declines, dropping by 40.5%, 39.1%, and 37.9%, respectively.

10.4.10 The data shows that Battles caused the most fatalities in both 2023 and 2024, with a 2.1% increase over the two years. Protests were the only other event type that resulted in more fatalities in 2024 than in 2023. In contrast, fatalities decreased for Riots (-94.1%), Explosions/remote violence (-46.9%), Strategic developments (-31.2%), and Violence against civilians (-13.9%).

10.5 Security events and casualties by location

10.5.1 Citing CIMP data, the OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report published the below map, showing fatalities by geography and type between January and October 2023^{[footnote 93]}:

Human needs report (page 9)

10.5.2 The following table was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool on 30 January 2025. It shows the numbers of security events and fatalities in each governorate of Yemen in 2023 and 2024. There were some events/fatalities in the data where no governorate was specified. Analysis of the ACLED data indicates that these security events were predominately drone and missile strikes that took place offshore in the seas around Yemen. They have been included in the below table for completeness. It should be noted that the below fatality data contains combatants and civilians^{[footnote 94]}:

Governorate	Security events 2023	Security events 2024	Total	Fatalities 2023	Fatalities 2024	Total
Abyan	323	204	527	182	196	378
Aden	384	184	568	35	20	55
Al Bayda	108	201	309	67	109	176
Al Hudaydah	689	733	1,422	160	158	318
Al Jawf	142	675	817	93	72	165
Al Mahrah	32	11	43	1	2	3
Al Mahwit	74	649	723	0	1	1
‘Amran	76	626	702	21	36	57
Dhale	249	330	579	165	117	282
Dhamar	180	681	861	17	11	28
Hadramaut	152	80	232	14	10	24
Hajjah	341	596	937	6	18	24
Ibb	353	1,579	1,932	60	48	108
Lahjj	198	174	372	137	253	390
Marib	444	608	1,052	363	159	522
Raymah	93	238	331	5	5	10
Saada	549	1,109	1,658	361	62	423
Sanaa	204	315	519	29	36	65
Sanaa City (Amanat al Asimah)	273	517	790	30	58	88
Shabwah	327	224	551	112	183	295
Socotra	17	4	21	0	0	0
Taiz	849	877	1,726	279	253	532
Unspecified	46	342	388	11	7	18
Total	6,103	10,957	17,060	2,148	1,814	3,962

10.5.3 The ACLED data shows that the governorates of Ibb (1,932), Taiz (1,726), and Saada (1,658) had the highest total number of security events between 1 January 2023 and 31 December 2024. Each of these governorates saw more security events in 2024 than in 2023. The governorates of Taiz (532), Marib (522) and Saada (423) had the highest number of fatalities across the same period, however, each of these governorates experienced lower numbers of fatalities in 2024 than in 2023. Of the 22 governorates, 15 governorates experienced more security events in 2024 than in 2023, whereas 7 governorates experienced less. In regard to fatalities, 10 governorates experienced higher levels of fatalities in 2024 than in 2023, 10 experienced less and 2 saw no change.

10.5.4 The ACLED Explorer has also been used to run and filter data queries relating to events and fatalities. ACLED notes the function of the tool as: ‘The ACLED Explorer allows you to filter and summarize data via an intuitive form that produces data tables and charts in answer to your questions about event types, actors, locations, and time periods dating back to 2018.’^{[footnote 95]}

10.5.5 The ACLED Explorer allows filtering by an event type coded as ‘civilian targeting’. Regarding this event type, ACLED stated:

‘In order to facilitate the analysis of all events in the ACLED dataset that feature violence targeting civilians, the “Civilian targeting” column allows for filtering of events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event. Besides events coded under the “Violence against civilians” event type, civilians may also be the main or only target of violence in events coded under the “Explosions/Remote violence’ event type (e.g. a landmine killing a farmer), “Riots” event type (e.g. a village mob assaulting another villager over a land dispute), and “Excessive force against protesters” sub-event type (e.g. state forces using lethal force to disperse peaceful protesters). Events in which civilians were incidentally harmed are not included in this category.’^{[footnote 96]}

10.5.6 The below table has been produced using data from the ACLED Explorer and shows the number of fatalities in each governorate which have been coded under the ‘Civilian targeting’ event type. As mentioned above, there are some fatalities which have not been assigned a specific governorate as a result of them occurring offshore in the seas around Yemen. It should be noted that as a result of incidents in which civilians were incidentally harmed not being included in the ‘Civilian targeting’ category, for example in ‘Battles’, it is likely that the numbers of civilian fatalities are higher than those shown below (for more information see the ACLED Codebook)^{[footnote 97]}:

Governorate	‘Civilian targeting’ fatalities
2023	2024
Abyan	14	9
Aden	11	10
Al Bayda	26	36
Al Hudaydah	103	65
Al Jawf	32	31
Al Mahrah	0	1
Al Mahwit	0	1
‘Amran	6	12
Dhale	12	9
Dhamar	12	5
Hadramaut	6	4
Hajjah	6	14
Ibb	37	17
Lahjj	15	13
Marib	20	19
Raymah	5	3
Saada	288	27
Sanaa	18	13
Sanaa City (Amanat al Asimah)	22	49
Shabwah	25	18
Socotra	0	0
Taiz	60	49
Unspecified	1	6
Total	719	411

10.5.7 The ACLED data above indicates there was a 42.8% reduction in ‘Civilian targeting’ fatalities between 2023 and 2024. In 2024, the governorates which experienced the highest level of ‘Civilian targeting’ fatalities were Al Hudaydah, Sanaa City, Taiz, Al Bayda and Al Jawf.

10.5.8 The CIMP 2024 annual report published the below map showing the density of civilian casualties as a result of armed violence in 2024^{[footnote 98]}:

Density of civilian casulaties (page 4)

10.5.9 The CIMP 2024 annual report additionally published the below graph which shows the number of civilian casualties reported in each governorate in 2023 and 2024^{[footnote 99]}:

2003	2004
Sa’dah	608	155
Hudaydah	193	326
Ta’izz	214	189
Bayda	73	55
Ma’rib	67	50
Ibib	52	55
Jawf	59	46
Aden	64	20
Shabwah	41	30
Abyan	43	28
Dali’	31	39
Sana’a	14	51
Lahij	35	29
Amran	43	17
Sana’a City	6	47
Hajjah	10	25
Dhamar	19	13
Raymah	6	11
Mahwit	0	3

10.5.10 The graph above indicates that the governorates with the highest levels of civilian casualties in 2024 were Al Hudaydah (326), Taiz (189), Saada (155), Al Bayda (55) and Ibb (55). The CIMP 2024 annual report stated the following regarding each of these governorates (it should be noted that the report did not specify how many fatalities were included in the total casualty figures for each governorate):

‘Hudaydah: For the first time since 2020, Hudaydah saw more civilian casualties (326) than any other governorate. Of the 326, 69% (224) were the result of airstrikes … 35 fatalities were reported among the civilian airstrike casualties. There were more civilian fatalities, however, caused by ERW [explosive remnants of warfare] in Hudaydah. Landmines and UXO [unexploded ordnance] accounted for 86 civilian casualties in Hudaydah in 2024, almost half of whom (38) were fatalities. …

‘Ta’izz: 189 civilian casualties were reported in Ta’izz. A large proportion were the result of continued hostilities on the Ta’izz frontlines; shellfire and drone activity were responsible for 70 civilian casualties in Ta’izz in 2024, over a third of the governorate’s total … In 2024, four in five civilian sniper casualties were reported in Ta’izz … Children are frequently reported among the frontline casualties in Ta’izz, and in 2024, more child casualties were reported in Ta’izz (61) than in any other governorate.

‘Sa’dah: Despite seeing a 75% decrease from the 608 civilian casualties reported in Sa’dah in 2023, the governorate again saw some of the highest civilian casualty numbers reported across the country. 155 civilian casualties were reported in Sa’dah in 2024. 92% (143) of these were on account of shelling and light weapons fire on the north-western international border, where civilians remain vulnerable to border violence, particularly those with a migration profile …

‘Bayda: Armed violence was directly responsible for a reported 55 civilian casualties in Bayda in 2024, including 33 fatalities. This marks the fourth highest casualty count in the country, and the third highest fatality count, up from 21 civilian fatalities in 2023. Over a third of the casualties were the result of a security campaign that escalated into violence in Rada city in March [2024]. Two houses were detonated with explosives, causing the collapse of another six nearby homes, in which eight civilians were killed, and eight injured. Another house in the neighbourhood was said to have been hit by a rocket-propelled grenade during the campaign, killing another five civilians. Bayda also saw eight civilian casualties as a result of ERW, half of which were reported in the dormant frontline district of Az Zahir.

‘Ibb: Joint with Bayda, Ibb saw the fourth highest civilian casualty count in the country, at 55, although a lower proportion of these were fatalities, at 15. This marks a slight increase in Ibb’s civilian casualty count of 52 in 2023. 71% (39) of the casualties reported in Ibb were the result of SAF [small arms fire] shootings. Of those casualties, at least 14 were the result of civilians being caught in the crossfire of clashes between armed factions, including five such instances in Al-Mashannah district, on the outskirts of Ibb city.’^{[footnote 100]}

10.6 Landmines and other explosive remnants of warfare (ERW)

10.6.1 On 11 January 2024, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published ‘World Report 2024 – Yemen’, covering events of 2023. The report, which cited various sources, stated:

‘On March 23 [2023], Save the Children stated that child casualties from landmines and unexploded ordinance [sic] (UXO) increased eight-fold from 2018 to 2022, and increased noticeably during the truce, highlighting the deadly legacy of the conflict. According to Save the Children, a child in Yemen was killed or injured by landmines or other UXOs every two days, on average, during 2022.

‘Houthi forces continue to use anti-personnel landmines … [they] use … mines in areas containing objects critical for survival, including farmland, water sources, and water infrastructure … Houthi forces have not shared any maps with mine removal authorities, violating their obligations under the Mine Convention.

‘Mine removal authorities have not followed the International Mine Action Standards in their removal of landmines, explosive remnants of war, and improvised explosive devices.’^{[footnote 101]}

10.6.2 The Mwatana report, covering 2023, stated: ‘… [M]any mines and explosive devices were planted, especially in the Harib district of Marib governorate.’^{[footnote 102]}

10.6.3 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report published the below maps of Yemen, showing the numbers of people it estimated would have needs due to mine action in 2024, and the severity of those needs, by location^{[footnote 103]}:

People in need	6.9 million
Women	25%
Children	50%
With disability	15%

10.6.4 The same source also stated: ‘Yemen remains one of the most contaminated countries globally by landmines and … ERW [explosive remnants of war] … and has the third highest number of casualties stemming from these threats over the past ten years … Civilians, particularly children, continue to be overrepresented in casualty numbers. In 2023 alone, landmines and ERW were the largest cause of child casualties - with more children impacted than by all other types of armed violence combined.’^{[footnote 104]}

10.6.5 The CIMP 2023 Annual Report stated:

‘Explosive remnants of warfare (ERW), including landmines, UXO and remnant IEDs [improvised explosive devices], remain a primary driver of civilian casualties in Yemen, accounting for 343 casualties in 2023, roughly half of whom (142) were fatalities. Moreover, 152 of the casualties were children [accounting for 54% of the 284 child casualties in 2023^{[footnote 105]}], who remain particularly vulnerable to ERW incidents. The west coast continues to see the highest ERW casualty numbers in the country …’^{[footnote 106]}

10.6.6 The CIMP 2023 Annual Report also noted that ‘the number of child ERW fatalities increased to 57 [in 2023], compared to 55 [in 2022].’^{[footnote 107]}

10.6.7 The CIMP 2024 annual report, covering the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 stated:

‘For the fourth year in a row, explosive remnants of warfare (ERW) were responsible for more child casualties than any other type of armed violence … ERW drove nearly a quarter of the women casualties in 2024, accounting for 13 casualties … Landmines and UXO were cumulatively responsible for 260 civilian casualties in 2024, including 84 fatalities. Over a third (106) were children. Although incidents and casualties were more dispersed across the country than in previous years, Hudaydah again saw more ERW casualties than anywhere else in the country, at 86.’^{[footnote 108]}

10.6.8 On 16 January 2025, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published ‘World Report 2025 – Yemen’, covering events of 2024. The report, which cited various sources, stated:

‘Landmines and explosive remnants of war continue to be a major cause of civilian casualties and continue to cause displacement. In the village of al-Shaqb, on the frontlines of the conflict in Taizz, many civilians have been injured and killed from the Houthis’ placement of landmines, and nearly the entire village has suffered from an inability to access their agricultural land - in many cases their sources of livelihood - due to the presence of uncleared landmines in their village. Between August 1, 2023 and July 31, 2024, 79 mine incidents killed 49 people and injured 66 others, including children, according to the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) [a special political mission which brings together civilian, military and police personnel, to support the Yemeni parties’ obligations to protect the city and ports of Hudaydah from conflict^{[footnote 109]}].’^{[footnote 110]}

10.6.9 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, stated: ‘Al Hodeidah Governorate is the most heavily impacted [by landmines and ERWs], with some 106 persons killed by landmines alone between January 2023 and August 2024.’^{[footnote 111]}

10.6.10 For more statistics on incidents involving landmines and other explosive remnants of warfare, see Security events and casualty numbers.

11. Law and order

11.1.1 The Freedom in the World 2024 report stated:

‘The judiciary, though nominally independent, is susceptible to interference from various political factions and armed groups. Authorities have a poor record of enforcing judicial rulings, particularly those issued against prominent tribal or political leaders. Lacking an effective court system, citizens often resort to tribal forms of justice and customary law. Criminal courts in Houthi-controlled areas remain active, but they are used as a political instrument by the Houthi leadership, according to UN experts. The judicial system is mostly inoperative in some other parts of the country.

‘… Arbitrary detention is common, with hundreds of cases documented in recent years … Human rights lawyers have faced detention or intimidation by both Houthi and internationally recognized government authorities, particularly when they attempt to represent high-profile defendants.

‘… Women[‘s] … testimony in court is equivalent to half that of a man.

‘… Effective legal protections … are also lacking for internally displaced persons (IDPs) …’^{[footnote 112]}

11.1.2 The CIMP 2023 Annual Report stated: ‘SAF [small arms fire] incidents appear to have been exacerbated by local dynamics in recent years, including economic grievances and weak rule of law and order …’^{[footnote 113]}

11.1.3 In June 2024, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), an Australian-based institute that focuses on research on global peace^{[footnote 114]}, published a report entitled ‘Global Peace Index 2024’. The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures a country’s level of ‘Negative Peace’ (described as the absence of violence or the fear of violence), using 27 indicators, which fall under 3 ‘domains of peacefulness’: Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict, Societal Safety and Security and Militarisation^{[footnote 115]}. For more information on the GPI methodology see Appendix A of the report. The report stated: ‘Yemen is the least peaceful country in the [Middle East and North Africa] region and the least peaceful country overall on the 2024 GPI. This is the first time that it has been ranked at the bottom of the index. Peacefulness in Yemen fell over the past year, owing to deteriorations on the violent demonstrations, political instability, and neighbouring countries relations indicators.’^{[footnote 116]}

11.1.4 The 16 October 2024 Sana’a Center report stated: ‘Following the cabinet reshuffle [in August 2024^{[footnote 117] [footnote 118]}], the Houthi-controlled parliament amended judicial laws and unveiled new judicial appointments that together will reshape and politicize the judiciary… Ultimately, the appointments and legal amendments reinforce Houthi control over key security, judicial, and governance positions.’^{[footnote 119]}

11.1.5 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, stated: ‘… [C]ivilian casualties stemming from the breakdown of law and order, [as well as] landmine-related incidents and localized conflicts persisted at the same rate as 2023.’^{[footnote 120]}

12. Displacement

12.1.1 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report included the below graph, showing the number of households subjected to sudden-onset displacements by armed conflict (and natural disasters) between 2019 and 2023^{[footnote 121]}:

Year	armed conflict	natural disaster
2019	58,200	9,800
2020	74,500	19,900
2021	56,900	14,700
2022	39,400	24,400
2023	10,800	33,800

12.1.2 The same source stated: ‘In 2023 alone, over 314,000 people (44,835 households) were newly displaced. During this period … 24 per cent (over 75,000 people) were displaced due to conflict.’^{[footnote 122]}

12.1.3 On 1 July 2024, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which gathers and analyses data on the mobility, vulnerabilities, and needs of displaced and mobile populations^{[footnote 123]}, published ‘Yemen - National Displacement Profile 2023’, covering 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023. The report stated:

‘As of September 2023, DTM Yemen recorded 2,791,603 internally displaced persons, as well as 1,878,906 returnees. Over half of IDPs reside in Marib (58%; 1,605,960 IDPs) followed by Ta’iz (14%, 380,712 IDPs), whereas the majority of returnees are present in Aden (36%; 668,682) and Ta’iz (33%; 618,293 returnees). Aden, a major urban centre, is perceived to host a large number of IDPs due to improved security, availability of economic opportunities and access to humanitarian assistance. The majority, 85 per cent, were originally displaced between January 2015 and December 2021, indicating a situation of protracted displacement. Returnee households mostly returned between January 2015 and December 2021 (88%), with seven per cent returning in 2022 and the remaining five per cent in 2023. The increases in IDPs and returnee figures since 2022 are mostly attributed to improved coverage in Yemen. As Yemen enters the ninth year of conflict since the escalation of hostilities in 2015, displaced populations still grapple with dissatisfaction due to insufficient services, deteriorating living standards, currency devaluation and insecurity, among other challenges.’^{[footnote 124]}

12.1.4 CPIT noted that the IOM DTM report did not specify how many of the IDPs were displaced due to conflict reasons but that a graphic published by the same source, showing the areas of origin and displacement, indicated that the majority cause for people in locations of displacement was conflict^{[footnote 125]}.

12.1.5 The HRW World Report 2024 noted that more than 3.1 million children were living in internal displacement in 2023^{[footnote 126]}.

12.1.6 On 31 March 2024, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which is the United Nations sexual and reproductive health agency^{[footnote 127]}, published a report entitled ‘2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen’ which stated: ‘An estimated 80 per cent of the 4.5 million people displaced in Yemen are women and children and around one quarter of displaced households are headed by women.’^{[footnote 128]}. CPIT noted that the above figure was unchanged from the previous annual UNFPA humanitarian response report^{[footnote 129]}.

12.1.7 On 18 January 2024, the OCHA published ‘Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 11, December 2023’ which stated: ‘Displaced [persons with disabilities] PWDs, in particular, face additional vulnerabilities in camps, such as insecurity, violence, and lack of safe, accessible facilities.’^{[footnote 130]}

12.1.8 The July 2024 UNFPA Situational Report 02 stated: ‘An uptick in violence and severe weather events has displaced over 75,600 individuals since the beginning of 2024.’^{[footnote 131]} CPIT noted that the report did not provide a breakdown of how many of those 75,600 people were displaced by violence versus how many were displaced by severe weather events.

12.1.9 A press release was published by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, formerly known as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) on 26 August 2024. It noted 4.5 million people to be living in displaced locations within Yemen in the first six months of 2024^{[footnote 132]}.

12.1.10 On 7 October 2024, the IOM DTM published ‘Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking - Biannual Report (January - June 2024)’ which stated:

‘The first half of 2024 saw new displacement, a continuing humanitarian challenge fueled by a combination of protracted conflict, economic hardship, and sporadic natural hazards …

‘Between January and June 2024, DTM tracked a total of 1,648 instances of household displacements [estimated to represent 6 individuals^{[footnote 133]}] across the country … [T]his can include multiple displacement meaning that these are not necessarily 1,648 distinct households. This period witnessed various trends in displacement, with numbers peaking in January [2024] and gradually declining through June [2024] with a peak in May [2024]. The decrease in displacement figures later in the period might reflect temporary lulls in conflict or seasonal factors, but it also raises concerns about underreported cases in more remote or inaccessible areas.

‘Ma’rib, Al Hodeidah, and Ta’iz emerged as the most affected governorates, with Marib alone accounting for 770 displaced households. The ongoing conflict in these regions, coupled with economic deterioration, has exacerbated the situation, forcing families to abandon their homes in search of safety. The relatively higher displacement in these areas can be attributed to their strategic significance in the ongoing conflict, making these hotspots of military activity and civilian casualties.’^{[footnote 134]}

12.1.11 The same source published the below pie chart, showing the reasons for the displacements^{[footnote 135]}:

Conflict reasons	61%
Economic reasons	38%
Natural hazard reasons	1%

12.1.12 In October 2024, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) published ‘Yemen Food Security Update: October 2024’. The report, which cited various sources, stated: ‘IOM estimated that approximately 6,618 people in Yemen were displaced at least once during Q3 2024, which is nearly the same level recorded in Q3 2023.’^{[footnote 136]}

12.1.13 On 6 January 2025, the IOM DTM published ‘Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (29 December 2024 – 4 January 2025)’, which included the below graph, showing the number of IDP households (estimated to represent 6 individuals) displaced per week in 2024^{[footnote 137]}:

Week	Month	Number
1	Jan	49
2	Jan	95
3	Jan	92
4	Jan	77
5	Feb	77
6	Feb	72
7	Feb	71
8	Feb	56
9	Mar	166
10	Mar	45
11	Mar	47
12	Mar	41
13	Mar	27
14	Apr	34
15	Apr	21
16	Apr	57
17	Apr	95
18	May	59
19	May	66
20	May	65
21	May	91
22	May	84
23	June	50
24	June	15
25	June	23
26	June	64
27	July	72
28	July	48
29	July	100
30	July	47
31	August	111
32	August	94
33	August	67
34	August	110
35	August	42
36	September	212
37	September	104
38	September	53
39	September	91
40	October	40
41	October	35
42	October	81
43	October	78
44	October	53
45	November	63
46	November	93
47	November	102
48	November	72
49	December	66
50	December	73
51	December	66
52	December	42
53	January	19

12.1.14 The same source stated: ‘From 1 January 2024 to 4 January 2025, IOM Yemen DTM tracked 3,678 households (22,068 Individuals) who experienced displacement at least once.’^{[footnote 138]}

12.1.15 On 4 December 2024, the UNHCR published an ‘IDP Protection Monitoring Update’, covering the period from 1 January to the end of November 2024. Based on data collected by UNHCR partners during interviews conducted with 104,033 households comprising 632,748 individuals assessed (with an average family size of 6)^{[footnote 139]}, the report found that 81% of assessed households were displaced persons and 34.4% had been displaced multiple times, with generalised violence and armed conflict having been the primary reason in 86% of cases^{[footnote 140]}.

12.1.16 The same source also stated:

• [The] [m]ajority of assessed IDPs originate from Al-Hodeidah (23 per cent), Taiz (21 per cent), and Hajja (17 per cent)

• ‘… 57.7 per cent of assessed households have no intention to return to their place of origin, the main factors for return include long-term safety and security (90.6 per cent)’^{[footnote 141]}

12.1.17 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, stated: ‘Conflict-induced displacement decreased further in 2024 …’^{[footnote 142]}

13. Freedom of movement

13.1.1 On 7 February 2023, the UNFPA published a report entitled ‘UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023’ which stated: ‘The ‘mahram’ (male guardian) requirement … [was] increasingly imposed in northern parts of the country in 2022, whereby women must be accompanied by a male family member to travel … [F]reedom of movement … [was] even more challenging for women and girls who lack access to legal documentation due to discriminatory laws and procedures.’^{[footnote 143]}

13.1.2 On 23 April 2024, USSD published ‘2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen’, covering events of 2023 (the 2023 USSD Human Rights report), which stated:

‘The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; however, the government and all parties to the conflict often did not respect those rights.

‘Progovernment forces, the Houthis, and tribal forces maintained checkpoints on major roads. In many regions, armed tribesmen frequently restricted freedom of movement, operated their own checkpoints, sometimes with military or other security officials, and often subjected travelers to physical harassment, extortion, theft, or short-term kidnappings for ransom. Damage to roads, bridges, and other infrastructure from the conflict hindered the movement of goods and persons throughout the country…

‘… Houthi forces had kept the main roads in and out of the city of Ta’iz closed since 2015, severely restricting freedom of movement for civilians … The Houthis agreed under the terms of the truce to negotiate with the government on restoring access to Ta’iz roads, but there was no progress while the truce remained in effect, and the roads remained closed as of year’s end [2023].

‘Women did not enjoy full freedom of movement, although restrictions varied by location.

‘… The Houthis increased the enforcement of mahram requirements, even though the law did not impose such requirements. The Houthis largely enforced mahram through verbal directives and governorate-level localized circulars. Tribal authorities in areas bordering Houthi-controlled territory also imposed mahram requirements. The unclear Houthi directives concerning mahram requirements resulted in some Sana’a-based car rental agencies refusing to rent vehicles to women or to sell seats to women for travel in shared vehicles.’^{[footnote 144]}

13.1.3 The Mwatana report, covering 2023, stated:

‘… [R]oad closures … occurred as a consequence [of clashes in the Al Bayda governorate, between the STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces and the Houthis]. These confrontations prompted the implementation of heightened security measures, increased military presence, and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, including freedom of movement, within these areas.

‘… [C]lashes [in Shabwah governorate] resulted in … military deployment, and further restrictions on freedom of movement …

‘… Restrictions on fundamental and public freedoms, including freedom of movement … persisted at the same pace despite a decrease in polarization and direct military confrontations between the parties. Freedom of movement remains heavily constrained due to the various illegal conditions imposed by the conflict parties on civilians, especially in closed areas like Saada and Hajjah or in the centers of control of the major conflict parties like Marib, Aden, and Sana’a.’^{[footnote 145]}

13.1.4 The OCHA January 2024 Humanitarian Needs report stated:

‘Civil documentation [which] includes birth certificates, marriage certificates, and identification cards … [is] essential for individuals to … move freely within and outside the country. Based on … studies, an estimated nine per cent of the total displaced population lack access to civil documentation … 37 per cent of adults lack a national ID card and 43 per cent of children lack a birth certificate … The lack of civil documentation is attributed to a number of factors …’^{[footnote 146]}

13.1.5 CPIT noted that the report did not detail the impact of a lack of a specific document on freedom of movement, nor whether impacts affect all people equally. For more information about the factors hindering the displaced population’s access to civil documentation (therefore impacting their ability to move freely within and outside of Yemen), see page 17 of the OCHA report.

13.1.6 The Freedom in the World 2024 report stated: ‘Movement within the country has been impaired by combat, land mines, damage to infrastructure, and checkpoints at which a variety of armed groups engage in harassment and extortion. Even in peacetime, a woman must obtain permission from her husband or father to receive a passport and travel abroad.’^{[footnote 147]}

13.1.7 Mwatana published an undated ‘Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations in Yemen’ which includes restrictions of freedom of movement by district, governorate, date, and actor. The data showed that Mwatana documented 126 restrictions of freedom of movement in Yemen between the outbreak of the conflict in late 2014 and 31 December 2024^{[footnote 148]}. The data should be considered in the context of Mwatana having stated that: ‘Mwatana emphasized that the information presented through the interactive map is not exhaustive. The map includes only what Mwatana has documented and verified according to its methodology. It represents a portion of the violations against civilians in Yemen, documented over the years of conflict.’^{[footnote 149]}

13.1.8 CPIT produced the following graph based on data from the Mwatana human rights violations interactive map, showing the number of restrictions of freedom of movement it documented in 2023 and 2024, by governorate^{[footnote 150]}:

Governorate	2023	2024
Aden	4	0
Al Mahwit	2	2
Amran	1	0
Marib	6	8
Raymah	1	0
Sanaa	3	0
Sanaa City	3	0
Socotra	0	1

13.1.9 For further information regarding the restrictions of freedom of movement recorded by Mwatana, including exact dates of incidents, districts of restrictions, and the actors of specific restrictions, and for up-to-date data, see the Mwatana human rights violations interactive map.

13.1.10 The HRW World Report 2025, covering events of 2024, stated:

‘Houthis have increasingly restricted women’s freedom of movement and imposed a strict policy requiring women to travel with a male relative (mahram) or to provide written approval from their male guardian allowing them to travel, a policy that had not existed before. In the south, even though there is no official guidance banning women from traveling alone between governorates, women have reported being stopped at Yemeni government and STC’s checkpoints for several hours, and sometimes forced to turn around.’^{[footnote 151]}

13.1.11 The CIMP 2024 Annual report stated that during 2024, 372 incidents resulted in 659 households having their freedom of movement restricted^{[footnote 152]}.

13.1.12 The same CIMP report also stated:

‘44 instances of armed violence impacted vehicles in 2024, resulting in 127 civilian casualties, including 38 fatalities, highlighting the continued hindrances armed violence is placing on civilian freedom of movement.

‘There was a significant increase in reports of armed violence impacting civilian transport, telecommunications and electricity infrastructure in 2024, driven entirely by the resumption of airstrikes on Yemen … Transport infrastructure was the most heavily impacted category, impacted in 33 incidents …

‘1,635,495 households [were] facing restricted access to transport infrastructure.’^{[footnote 153]}

13.1.13 The OCHA HNRP, published on 15 January 2025, stated: ‘… [N]ew road openings – notably in Ta’iz and Marib – enhanced civilians’ freedom of movement … as well as facilitated returns across front lines.’^{[footnote 154]}

13.1.14 For information about some specific roads that were closed as of the end of June 2024, see details about a public symposium organised by The Yemeni Coalition for Human Rights in cooperation with the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), an independent regional human rights organisation^{[footnote 155]} on 1 July 2024.

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source

• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used

• the currency and detail of information

• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of Reference

The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

• actors in conflict – number, size, intent and capacity

• geographical scope of conflict

• nature of violence - methods and tactics, including targeting of groups (age, sex, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc)

• number of security incidents

  • frequency and density in relation to local population

  • variation by place, time and groups affected

• number of civilian casualties, including

  • fatalities and injuries (also as a proportion of total population)

  • variation by place, time and group

• conflict-induced displacement

• indirect impact of violence on law and order

• ability of civilians to freely move

Bibliography

Sources cited

ACAPS, Yemen Analysis Hub – Areas of Control, 16 January 2025. Accessed: 31 January 2025

Al Jazeera,

• Do Yemen’s Houthis have their eye on Marib?, 4 February 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

• Houthis are recruiting record fighters. How will this affect Yemen?, 23 February 2024. Accessed: 31 December 2024

• What the designation of ‘terrorist’ means for Yemen’s Houthis, 18 January 2024. Accessed: 31 January 2025

• Who are the Houthis? A simple guide to the Yemeni group, 12 January 2024. Accessed: 29 October 2024

Amnesty International (AI), The State of the World’s Human Rights, 23 April 2024. Accessed: 15 November 2024

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED),

• Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024. Accessed: 14 January 2025

• Explorer, no date. Accessed: 14 January 2025

• Data Export Tool, no date. Accessed: 14 January 2025

• Data Export Tool - Yemen: 1 January 2023 – 31 December 2024, 30 January 2025. Accessed: 30 January 2025

• FAQs: ACLED Fatality Methodology, January 2023. Accessed: 14 January 2025

• What types of events does ACLED code?, 9 May 2023, last updated 1 November 2023. Accessed: 14 January 2025

• Yemen Conflict Observatory, no date, updated 31 January 2024. Accessed: 21 February 2025

BBC News,

• Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names, 2 December 2015. Accessed: 2 January 2025

• US warships and planes strike Houthi targets in Yemen, 4 October 2024. Accessed: 2 January 2024

• Yemen conflict explained in 400 words, 13 June 2018. Accessed: 30 December 2024

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS),

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 20 November 2024

• Yemen: At Symposium on Sidelines of [Human Rights Council], Renewed Demand to Open the Roads, 1 July 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Risking the Future: Climate Change, Environmental Destruction, and Conflict in Yemen, October 2022. Accessed: 27 August 2024

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook,

• United Kingdom, updated 25 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• Yemen, updated 25 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP),

• 2023 Annual Report, January 2024. Accessed: 25 October 2024

• 2024 Annual Report, January 2025. Accessed: 5 February 2025

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),

• About CFR, no date. Accessed: 12 March 2025

• Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know, 1 March 2024. Accessed: 12 March 2025

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), UNMHA, Hudaydah Agreement, 16 January 2019. Accessed: 15 January 2025

Ecoi.net, Source description - Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly: CIVIC - Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict), 15 September 2022. Accessed: 27 August 2024

Encyclopaedia Britannica,

• Gulf Cooperation Council, updated 23 August 2024. Accessed: 29 August 2024

• Shiʿi, no date, last updated 20 December 2024. Accessed: 30 December 2024

• Zaydiyyah, no date. Accessed: 30 December 2024

Fadaat Media, About Us, no date. Accessed: 12 March 2025

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Iran-Saudi Normalization: A Regional Process with Chinese Characteristics, 24 March 2023. Accessed: 2 January 2024

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen, 29 February 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

GlobalSecurity.org, Bab al-Mandab strait, no date. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Gov.uk, Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations, no date, updated 26 April 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Ground News, News from Al Jazeera, no date. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX),

• ACAPS, no date. Accessed: 31 January 2025

• Frequently Asked Questions, no date. Accessed: 31 January 2025

Human Rights Watch (HRW),

World Report 2024, 11 January 2024. Accessed: 19 November 2024

World Report 2025, 16 January 2025. Accessed: 31 January 2025

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP),

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 21 November 2024

• Global Peace Index 2024, 11 June 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

International Organization for Migration (IOM), About DTM, no date. Accessed: 25 October 2024

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM),

• Yemen - National Displacement Profile 2023, 1 July 2024. Accessed: 25 October 2024

• Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (29 December 2024 - 4 January 2025), 6 January 2025. Accessed: 17 February 2025

• Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking - Biannual Report (January - June 2024), 7 October 2024. Accessed: 25 October 2025

• Yemen, no date. Accessed: 25 October 2024

Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF),

• Homepage, no date. Accessed: 21 March 2025

• JIAF 2: Technical Manual, July 2024. Accessed: 21 March 2025

Modern Insurgent,

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 2 January 2025

• Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF), 22 March 2023. Accessed: 2 January 2025

Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana),

• About Mwatana, no date. Accessed: 15 November 2024

• Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations Yemen, no date. Accessed: 15 January 2025

• Interactive Map of Landmines, Explosive Devices, and Remnants of War in Yemen, no date. Accessed: 19 November 2024

• Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023, 18 July 2024. Accessed: 27 December 2024

• Violators / Subjects, no date. Accessed 19 November 2024

Center for the New South (PCNS),

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 12 November 2024

• Yemen’s Path to Stability: Evaluating the Presidential Leadership Council’s Role and Impact, 15 October 2024. Accessed: 12 November 2024

Reuters, What is U.S.-led Red Sea coalition and which countries are backing it?, 22 December 2023. Accessed: 2 January 2024

Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (Sana’a Center),

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2024

• The Riyadh Agreement: Saudi Arabia Takes the Helm in Southern Yemen, 5 November 2019. Accessed: 31 December 2024

• The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024, 16 October 2024. Accessed: 5 November 2024

• The Yemen Review Quarterly: October-December 2024, 4 February 2024. Accessed: 12 March 2025

The Guardian, Yemen crowd crush: at least 85 dead after Houthi gunfire sparks panic, 20 April 2023. Accessed: 31 December 2024

The New Arab (TNA),

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 31 December 2024

• The STC struggles to define its future in a fragmented Yemen, 26 August 2024. Accessed: 31 December 2024

• What the Houthi government reshuffle means for Yemen, 20 August 2024. Accessed: 8 January 2024

The White House, Presidential Actions, Designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 22 January 2025. Accessed: 18 March 2025

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

• Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 15 January 2025. Accessed: 12 March 2025

• Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024), 1 February 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

• Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 11, December 2023, 18 January 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

UN Population Fund (UNFPA),

• Situational Report #02 April–June 2024, 29 July 2024. Accessed: 30 October 2024

• UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023, 7 February 2023. Accessed: 30 October 2024

• Who we are, no date. Accessed: 30 October 2024

2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen (p6), 31 March 2024. Accessed: 30 October 2024

UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, formerly known as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees),

• Displaced Yemenis Struggle Amidst Growing Needs in Prolonged Crisis, 26 August 2024. Accessed: 21 February 2025

• [IDP Protection Monitoring Update], 4 December 2024. Accessed: 31 January 2024

• UNHCR Yemen Country Factsheet January - June 2024, 28 August 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

UN World Food Programme (WFP), Yemen Food Security Update: October 2024, October 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

US Department of State (USSD),

• Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Yemen, 30 November 2023. Accessed: 28 August 2024

• Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Yemen, 12 December 2024. Accessed: 30 December 2024

• 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Yemen, 23 April 2024. Accessed: 15 November 2024

• 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Yemen, 26 June 2024. Accessed: 29 August 2024

World Bank Group, The World Bank In Yemen, no date, updated 25 October 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

Sources consulted but not cited

ACAPS, Yemen: Challenges to Housing, Land, and Property Rights, 14 April 2023. Accessed: 9 December 2024

Al Jazeera,

• Beyond Gaza: How Yemen’s Houthis gain from attacking Red Sea ships, 22 December 2023. Accessed: 30 December 2024

• Houthis leave Saudi Arabia after talks on potential Yemen ceasefire deal, 19 September 2023. Accessed: 30 December 2024

AS, Who are the Houthis, what is happening in Yemen and why have the US and the UK attacked them?, 13 January 2024. Accessed: 31 December 2024

Associated Press (AP) News,

• EXPLAINER: Why Yemen’s war has spilled into the Emirates, 25 January 2022. Accessed: 30 December 2024

• Saudi Arabia praises “positive results” after Yemen’s Houthi rebels visit kingdom for peace talks, 20 September 2023. Accessed: 30 August 2024

• Yemen’s southern leader renews calls for separate state at UN, 23 September 2024. Accessed: 30 August 2024

Arab Center Washington DC, Divergent Saudi-Emirati Agendas Cripple Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, 15 May 2024. Accessed: 30 December 2024

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?, 6 April 2023. Accessed: 30 August 2024

BBC News, Yemen president hands power to council in major shake-up, 7 April 2022. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Chatham House, The Houthis have cracked down brutally on Yemeni civil society. A strategic response is required, 7 August 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Global Conflict Tracker: Yemen, updated 8 October 2024. Accessed: 30 December 2024

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS), Women Peace and Security Index 2023/24, 24 October 2023. Accessed: 14 November 2024

Human Rights Watch (HRW),

• “Death is More Merciful Than This Life”: Houthi and Yemeni Government Violations of the Right to Water in Taizz, 11 December 2023. Accessed: 20 November 2024

• Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Lives, Livelihoods, 23 May 2024. Accessed: 21 November 2024

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Yemen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis July 2024 – February 2025, 16 October 2024. Accessed: 20 November 2024

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2024 Global Report on Internal Displacement, 14 May 2024. Accessed: 25 October 2025

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Yemen – Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (20 - 26 October 2024), 27 October 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Middle East Institute, Changing dynamics reshape power networks in Yemen’s “two Hadramawts”, 24 July 2023. Accessed: 5 November 2024

OnTheWorldMap.com, Yemen Map, 2021. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (Sana’a Center), The War on Yemen’s Roads, 16 January 2023. Accessed: 27 August 2024

Southern Transitional Council (STC), President Al-Zubaidi Congratulates People of the South on New Year 2025, 31 December 2024. Accessed: 2 January 2025

UN, Amid Relative Calm in Yemen, Warring Parties Must Halt Military Provocations, Achieve Key Breakthrough to End War, Special Envoy Tells Security Council, 10 July 2023. Accessed: 30 August 2024

UN News, UN envoy welcomes “significant step” towards ceasefire in Yemen, 26 December 2023. Accessed: 30 December 2024

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Yemen Humanitarian Update - Issue 12/December 2022, 18 January 2023. Accessed: 3 September 2024

UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, formerly known as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees),

• IDP Protection Monitoring Update, 31 July 2024. Accessed: 2 September 2024

• 2023 Quarter 4 Factsheet, 9 April 2024. Accessed: 3 September 2024

US Embassy & Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, Terrorist Designation of the Houthis, 18 January 2024. Accessed: 30 December 2024

Wilson Center, Yemen 2021: Islah, the Houthis & Jihadis, 17 March 2021. Accessed: 5 November 2024

WorldAtlas, Maps Of Yemen, 7 December 2022. Accessed: 9 December 2024

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1. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (Geography), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

2. CIA World Factbook, United Kingdom (Geography), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

3. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (Geography), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

4. Burrowes and Wenner, EB, Yemen (Land), updated 14 January 2025 ↩

5. WorldAtlas, About WorldAtlas, no date ↩

6. WorldAtlas, Maps Of Yemen, updated 7 December 2022 ↩

7. OnTheWorldMap.com, Yemen Map, 2021 ↩

8. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

9. OCHA, Yemen, 2024 ↩

10. CIA World Factbook, United Kingdom (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

11. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

12. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (People and Society), updated 25 November 2024 ↩

13. Cartograf.fr (English version), Research, no date ↩

14. Cartograf.fr (English version), Map of Yemen with population density, no date ↩

15. PCNS, About Us, no date ↩

16. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Zaydiyyah, no date ↩

17. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Shiʿi, no date, last updated 20 December 2024 ↩

18. PCNS, Yemen’s Path to Stability … (pages 3 and 5), 15 October 2024 ↩

19. Ecoi.net, Source description - Center for Civilians in Conflict …, 15 September 2022 ↩

20. CIVIC, … Climate Change, Environmental Destruction … Conflict in Yemen (page 9), October 2022 ↩

21. The Guardian, … [C]rowd crush: at least 85 dead after Houthi gunfire sparks panic, 20 April 2023 ↩

22. Mwatana, About Mwatana, no date ↩

23. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023 (page 36), 18 July 2024 ↩

24. ACLED, Yemen Conflict Observatory, no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

25. ACLED, … Conflict Observatory (Actor Profiles: IRG, footnote), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

26. ACLED, Yemen Conflict Observatory (Actor Profiles: IRG), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

27. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen (sections A3 and C1), 29 February 2024 ↩

28. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023 (page 24), 18 July 2024 ↩

29. PCNS, Yemen’s Path to Stability … (pages 11 and 17), 15 October 2024 ↩

30. USSD, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Yemen, 12 December 2024 ↩

31. USSD, Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Yemen, 30 November 2023 ↩

32. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (Military and Security), updated 22 December 2024 ↩

33. ACLED, … [YCO] (Actor Profiles: Saudi-led Coalition), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

34. PCNS, Yemen’s Path to Stability … (page 6), 15 October 2024 ↩

35. CIVIC, … Climate… Environment … and Conflict in Yemen (footnote 39), October 2022 ↩

36. Ground News, News from Al Jazeera, no date ↩

37. Al Jazeera, Do Yemen’s Houthis have their eye on Marib?, 4 February 2024 ↩

38. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen (section C1), 29 February 2024 ↩

39. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (Military and Security), updated 22 December 2024 ↩

40. ACLED, Yemen Conflict Observatory (Actor Profiles: Houthis), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

41. Al Jazeera, Who are the Houthis? A simple guide to the Yemeni group, 12 January 2024 ↩

42. CIA World Factbook, Yemen (Military and Security), updated 22 December 2024 ↩

43. Al Jazeera, Houthis are recruiting record fighters. How will this affect Yemen?, 23 February 2024 ↩

44. CFR, About CFR, no date ↩

45. CFR, Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know, 1 March 2024 ↩

46. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom… (page 2), 26 June 2024 ↩

47. ACLED, … [YCO] (… Profiles: Southern Transitional Council), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

48. AI, The State of the World’s Human Rights (Yemen) (page 410), 23 April 2024 ↩

49. TNA, About Us, no date ↩

50. Fadaat Media, About Us, no date ↩

51. TNA, The STC struggles to define its future in a fragmented Yemen, 26 August 2024 ↩

52. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights … 2023 (pages 21 and 24), 18 July 2024 ↩

53. ACLED, … [YCO] (Elite Forces and Security Belt Forces), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

54. ACLED, … [YCO] (Actor Profiles: Joint Forces …), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

55. Modern Insurgent, About Us, no date ↩

56. Modern Insurgent, Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF), 22 March 2023 ↩

57. ACLED, … [YCO] (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

58. USSD, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Yemen, 12 December 2024 ↩

59. ACLED, … [YCO] (Actor Profiles: Islamic State in Yemen), no date, updated 31 January 2024 ↩

60. USSD, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Yemen, 12 December 2024 ↩

61. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 36), 1 February 2024 ↩

62. JIAF, Homepage, no date ↩

63. JIAF, JIAF 2: Technical Manual (page 33), July 2024 ↩

64. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 37), 1 February 2024 ↩

65. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 3), January 2024 ↩

66. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 4), January 2024 ↩

67. Al Jazeera, Who are the Houthis? A simple guide to the Yemeni group, 12 January 2024 ↩

68. Al Jazeera, Do Yemen’s Houthis have their eye on Marib?, 4 February 2024 ↩

69. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen (section F3), 29 February 2024 ↩

70. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights … 2023 (pages 24 to 25), 18 July 2024 ↩

71. Reuters, What is U.S.-led Red Sea coalition and which countries… back… it?, 22 December 2023 ↩

72. BBC News, US warships and planes strike Houthi targets in Yemen, 4 October 2024 ↩

73. PCNS, Yemen’s Path to Stability … (pages 18 and 20), 15 October 2024 ↩

74. Sana’a Center, About Us, no date ↩

75. Sana’a Center, The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024 (page 4), 16 October 2024 ↩

76. World Bank Group, The World Bank In Yemen (Overview: Context), updated 25 October 2024 ↩

77. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report (page 5), January 2025 ↩

78. Sana’a Center, The Yemen Review Quarterly: October-December 2024, 4 February 2024 ↩

79. PCNS, Yemen’s Path to Stability … (page 8), 15 October 2024 ↩

80. Sana’a Center, The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024 (page 22), 16 October 2024 ↩

81. HDX, Frequently Asked Questions, no date ↩

82. HDX, ACAPS, no date ↩

83. ACAPS, Yemen Analysis Hub – Areas of Control, 16 January 2025 ↩

84. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023 (page 46), 18 July 2024 ↩

85. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights … 2023 (pages 14 and 25), 18 July 2024 ↩

86. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen (section F3), 29 February 2024 ↩

87. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 8), 1 February 2024 ↩

88. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 5), January 2024 ↩

89. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report (page 5), January 2025 ↩

90. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report (page 3), January 2025 ↩

91. ACLED, What types of events does ACLED code?, 9 May 2023, last updated 1 November 2023 ↩

92. ACLED, Data Export Tool - Yemen: 1 January 2023 – 31 December 2024, 30 January 2025 ↩

93. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 9), 1 February 2024 ↩

94. ACLED, Data Export Tool - Yemen: 1 January 2023 – 31 December 2024, 30 January 2025 ↩

95. ACLED, Explorer, no date ↩

96. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

97. ACLED, Explorer, no date ↩

98. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report (page 4), January 2025 ↩

99. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report (page 5), January 2025 ↩

100. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report (page 10), January 2025 ↩

101. HRW, World Report 2024 – Yemen (pages 722 to 723), 11 January 2024 ↩

102. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights … 2023 (page 26), 18 July 2024 ↩

103. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 38), 1 February 2024 ↩

104. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 17), 1 February 2024 ↩

105. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 2), January 2024 ↩

106. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 7), January 2024 ↩

107. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 2), January 2024 ↩

108. CIMP, 2024 Annual Report, (page 2), January 2025 ↩

109. DPPA, UNMHA, Hudaydah Agreement, 16 January 2019 ↩

110. HRW, World Report 2025 – Yemen (page 537), January 2025 ↩

111. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, (page 13) 15 January 2025 ↩

112. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen (sections F1, F2 and F4), 29 February 2024 ↩

113. CIMP, 2023 Annual Report (page 7), January 2024 ↩

114. IEP, About Us, no date ↩

115. IEP, Global Peace Index 2024 (page 68), 11 June 2024 ↩

116. IEP, Global Peace Index 2024 (page 17), 11 June 2024 ↩

117. Sana’a Center, The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024 (page 5), 16 October 2024 ↩

118. TNA, What the Houthi government reshuffle means for Yemen, 20 August 2024 ↩

119. Sana’a Center, … Review Quarterly: July-September 2024 (pages 12 to 13), 16 October 2024 ↩

120. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, (page 11) 15 January 2025 ↩

121. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 … (pages 15 and 63), 1 February 2024 ↩

122. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 15), 1 February 2024 ↩

123. IOM, About DTM, no date ↩

124. IOM DTM, Yemen - National Displacement Profile 2023 (page 1), 1 July 2024 ↩

125. IOM DTM, Yemen - National Displacement Profile 2023 (page 2), 1 July 2024 ↩

126. HRW, World Report 2024 – Yemen (page 722), 11 January 2024 ↩

127. UNFPA, Who we are, no date ↩

128. UNFPA, 2024 UNFPA humanitarian response In Yemen (page 5), 31 March 2024 ↩

129. UNFPA, UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023 (page 8), 7 February 2023 ↩

130. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Update: Issue 11, December 2023 (page 5), 18 January 2024 ↩

131. UNFPA, Situational Report #02 April – June 2024 (page 1), 29 July 2024 ↩

132. UNHCR, Displaced Yemenis Struggle Amidst Growing Needs in Prolonged Crisis, 26 August 2024 ↩

133. IOM DTM, Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking - Biannual Report… (page 1), 7 October 2024 ↩

134. IOM DTM, Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking - Biannual Report… (page 1), 7 October 2024 ↩

135. IOM DTM, Yemen - Rapid Displacement Tracking - Biannual Report… (page 3), 7 October 2024 ↩

136. WFP, Yemen Food Security Update: October 2024 (page 3), October 2024 ↩

137. IOM DTM, Yemen … Displacement … (29 December 2024 – 4 January 2025), 6 January 2025 ↩

138. IOM DTM, Yemen… Displacement Tracking Update (20 - 26 October 2024), 27 October 2024 ↩

139. UNHCR, [IDP Protection Monitoring Update] (page 1), 4 December 2024 ↩

140. UNHCR, [IDP Protection Monitoring Update] (page 2), 4 December 2024 ↩

141. UNHCR, [IDP Protection Monitoring Update] (page 2), 4 December 2024 ↩

142. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, (page 11) 15 January 2025 ↩

143. UNFPA, UNFPA Humanitarian Response in Yemen 2023 (page 6), 7 February 2023 ↩

144. USSD, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… (pages 32 to 33 and 34), 23 April 2024 ↩

145. Mwatana, Legacy of Gunpowder: Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2023 (page 26), 18 July 2024 ↩

146. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (January 2024) (page 17), 1 February 2024 ↩

147. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024 – Yemen (section G1), 29 February 2024 ↩

148. Mwatana, Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations…, no date, accessed 21 February 2025 ↩

149. Mwatana, Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations Yemen, no date ↩

150. Mwatana, Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations…, no date, accessed 21 February 2025 ↩

151. HRW, World Report 2025 – Yemen (page 535), 16 January 2025 ↩

152. CIMP, Annual Report 2024, (page 8), January 2025 ↩

153. CIMP, Annual Report 2024, (pages 8 and 9), January 2025 ↩

154. OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, (page 11) 15 January 2025 ↩

155. CIHRS, About Us, no date ↩