Guidance

The Amber Book: Appendices (HTML)

Updated 28 April 2025

Appendix A: Resilience Cycle

Figure 1: Resilience Cycle

1. The Resilience Cycle (shown in Figure 1) comprises eight interrelated activities:

• Anticipation: horizon scanning for new risks that have the potential to cause harm and loss, or for strategic changes which may change the nature of currently identified risks.
• Assessment: the analysis of identified risks to understand the likelihood of their occurrence and their potential impacts across a range of measures.
• Prevention/mitigation: the actions undertaken to seek to avoid, or at least to reduce the likelihood of, a risk arising, or to reduce the impacts of an emergency were a risk to arise.
• Preparation: the development of the emergency plans and capabilities needed to provide an effective response to identified potential emergencies and unforeseen events, thus reducing harm and loss.
• Validation and assurance: the actions taken to establish and to provide assurance to senior leaders at organisational, locality, devolved or UK level on the ability to provide an effective response to identify potential emergencies, including identifying major gaps and weaknesses that need to be addressed.
• Response: the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency.
• Recovery: the actions taken to rebuild, restore and rehabilitate affected communities following an emergency.
• Learning and improvement: the actions taken to identify lessons – both strengths and weaknesses – from the response to emergencies and then to act to adopt and embed improvements, as part of a cycle of continuous improvement in risk and emergency management.

2. The Resilience Cycle builds on the concept of Integrated Emergency Management to include two additional stages:

• validation and assurance
• learning and improvement

Appendix B: Overview of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

3. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and accompanying non-legislative measures, delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. A copy of the Civil Contingency Act 2004 is available at legislation.gov.uk. The Act is separated into two substantive parts:

• local arrangements for civil protection (Part 1)
• emergency powers (Part 2)

Part 1 

4. This part of the act, together with supporting regulations and statutory guidance for emergency preparedness^{[footnote 1]}, establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each.

5. Those in Category 1 are organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They will be required to:

• assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
• put in place emergency plans
• put in place business continuity management arrangements
• put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency
• share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
• co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency
• provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only)

6. Co-operating bodies (Category 2) such as the Health and Safety Executive and transport and utility companies are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties – co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.

7. Category 1 and 2 organisations will come together to form local resilience forums (based on police areas) which will help co-ordination and co-operation between responders at the local level.^{[footnote 2]}

8. The bulk of Part 1 of the Act was brought into force in November 2005 (the duty on local authorities to provide advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations about business continuity management commenced in May 2006).

Part 2 

9. This part of the Act updates the 1920 Emergency Powers Act to reflect the developments in the intervening years and the current and future risk profile. It allows for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious of emergencies. The use of emergency powers is a last resort option and planning arrangements at the local level should not assume that emergency powers will be made available. Their use is subject to a robust set of safeguards – they can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances. Part 2 of the Act was brought into force in December 2004.

Emergency powers 

10. Emergency powers allow the government to make special temporary legislation (emergency regulations) as a last resort in the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way. Emergency regulations may make provision of any kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament or by exercise of the Royal Prerogative, so long as such action is needed urgently and is both necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.

11. The Act states that emergency powers can only be used if an event or situation threatens serious damage to:

• human welfare in the UK, a devolved territory or region
• the environment of the UK, a devolved territory or region, or
• the security of the UK, from war or terrorism

12. They can be used if such a situation is occurring, has occurred or is about to occur. Once laid (as soon as reasonably practical), the regulations lapse after 7 days unless each House of Parliament approves them.

13. The Act mandates the appointment of an emergency co-ordinator in whichever of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland the regulations have effect. In England, an emergency co-ordinator is then required in each of the English regions in which the regulations have effect. The purpose of these co-ordinators is to “facilitate the co-ordination of activities under the emergency regulations”.

Procedures for use of emergency powers

14. Making emergency regulations involves co-ordination across government. In particular, the Lead Government Department (LGD) and the Cabinet Office must work closely together. The LGD is responsible for drafting and implementing the emergency regulations. The Cabinet Office will co-ordinate cross government input through Cabinet or Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR). It is the role of the LGD to:

• determine that policy intent cannot be achieved through alternative means or existing powers following discussion with departmental legal advisers. If there is insufficient time or practical barriers to legislating in the normal way, they will consider the possibility of using emergency powers to deliver the required powers. The LGD should approach the COBR Unit officials who will act in an advisory capacity
• obtain agreement from the lead minister to proceed with possible use of emergency powers
• alert the Parliamentary Counsel, His Majesty’s Stationary Office and Privy Council Office. COBR Unit should be kept informed throughout the process with regards to drafting/timings
• chair the official-level working group of relevant departments and devolved governments, which considers and agrees provisional policy content of emergency regulations, alongside implementation, communication and resource issues
• ensure that COBR agrees the policy content/wording of emergency regulations
• ensure that the proposed legislation is reviewed by Parliamentary Counsel – if necessary, Cabinet Office legal advisers will co-ordinate legal inputs from across Whitehall and the devolved governments
• consult ministers from devolved governments (should be present in COBR) if the order applies to Scotland, Wales and/or Northern Ireland unless a senior minister decides urgency prevents this
• lead on parliamentary handling/publication of the regulations – order to be made by the King in Council (or by senior minister if allowed by the Act)
• keep the regulations under review and ensure that COBR are appraised of the current position. If the regulations are no longer needed they will be revoked. If at any time it is possible, and appropriate, for the government and/or the devolved governments to obviate the need for the regulations by enacting appropriate legislation through the normal legislative processes, this should be done and the regulations revoked. If regulations are still required when the initial set fall (after 30 days), COBR will agree to their renewal, with or without amendment (on the advice of the LGD)

Appendix C: Default COBR response assumptions

15. While the exact nature of a crisis will determine the suitable response arrangements, having a clear set of expectations for how the collective central government response will be structured and organised supports the effective transition into a central government response.

16. Alongside the underpinning emergency response principles, the following set of assumptions will guide the development of tailored central government response arrangements where the nature of the potential emergency allows time for such refinement to take place.

Emergency management in the UK

17. Emergency response is underpinned by the principle of subsidiarity, meaning in practice most emergencies are handled at the local level by Category 1 and 2 responders. The structure for managing the local multi-agency response to emergencies is based on the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

18. Where there is a requirement for central government involvement, the UK adopts a Lead Government Department (LGD) model, where the LGD, with support from other departments and bodies, will have national-level responsibility for leading/co-ordinating the central response to the emergency.  Individual departments and the devolved governments are responsible for issues arising within their areas of responsibility. In instances where it is unclear which department should take the overall lead, it is then the Cabinet Office to advise the Prime Minister on which department is the most appropriate LGD. If this happens, the Cabinet Office will co-ordinate the central government response, leading where necessary until an LGD is confirmed.

19. For the most severe and complex crises, a COBR response will be activated to co-ordinate the acute response and facilitate effective decision-making. In such instances, Cabinet Office would co-ordinate the central government response in support of the LGD.

20. Where a crisis is so serious as to have whole-of-system implications, Cabinet Office (in its role as the department which supports the Prime Minister and the effective running of government) will take on a leadership role for the response.

21. For COBR-led responses the typical governance arrangements to centrally co-ordinate the government response to both acute and chronic crises are:

• for the acute phase of a crisis, Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) crisis management arrangements will be entered into
• for the enduring phase of an enduring whole-of-system crisis, the Strategy and Operations Cabinet committee model would typically be established to provide collective oversight of the enduring policy and operational response, with a central structure providing the secretariat function and central co-ordination for the enduring response – however, the final decision on the appropriate Cabinet committee structure would be taken by the Prime Minister, on the advice of the Cabinet Secretary

COBR response

22. The Lead Minister is the minister responsible for leading the UK government’s collective response to a crisis. The Lead Minister is accountable to Parliament for the co-ordination of ministerial decision-making during the response and the collective central government response. The Prime Minister may take on this role for the highest impact or catastrophic events.

23. A Crisis Senior Responsible Owner (Crisis SRO) will be agreed by Cabinet Office and the LGD at the onset of a crisis. Where it is unclear who the Crisis SRO is, the Cabinet Secretary will take on this role until they have appointed a suitable official, based on the advice of the Cabinet Office and LGD.

24. A COBR response structure will be established to centrally co-ordinate government response activities and provide a secretariat function for COBR meetings. The COBR response structure will always contain a Policy, Situation and Operations Cell, although additional plug-in functions can be established to co-ordinate specific expert advice and specialist activity.

25. The LGD will remain in place to inform the central government response to the crisis and is accountable, through their Secretary of State, to Parliament for the collective central government response

26. The Cabinet Office in consultation with the LGD and the Prime Minister’s Office will decide on the scheduling of meetings (the ‘daily rhythm’) and whether and which departments need to be represented at COBR.

27. The chair for ministerial meetings of COBR chair would typically be taken by the Secretary of State of the government department with lead responsibility for the particular issue being considered, a Cabinet Office minister, or the Prime Minister. Official meetings of COBR would typically be chaired by the Cabinet Secretary/National Security Adviser (or Deputy National Security Adviser), Crisis SRO, or the COBR Response Director.

28. The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) provides scientific and technical advice to support government decision makers during COBR responses. Decisions on activating a SAGE would be taken by the Cabinet Office in consultation with the Government Office for Science and the LGD.

Media and public information handling/co-ordination

29. The Cabinet Office will provide strategic support for communications in a crisis, in line with the Crisis Communications Operating Model.^{[footnote 3]}

Additional arrangements for terrorist or suspected terrorist emergencies

30. Where terrorism is suspected, the immediate central government operational response will be led by the Home Office as the LGD working closely with operational partners, including the police, emergency responders and where applicable intelligence agencies. The level of central government response will be determined by COBR or wider Cabinet Office, in consultation with the Home Office as the LGD.

31. The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) is responsible for counter-Northern Ireland Related Terrorism policy in Northern Ireland. A terrorist attack in Northern Ireland relating to non-Northern Ireland Related Terrorism, such as Islamist or Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism would see the Home Office assume responsibility as the LGD, working closely with the Northern Ireland Office, and with the relevant Northern Ireland department(s). If, following a terrorist incident in the province, there is a need to activate COBR (as opposed to NIOBR), the Cabinet Office will decide in consultation with the Northern Ireland Office, Home Office and the Prime Minister’s Office who should chair in light of circumstances at the time.

Support for local emergencies

32. When COBR is activated, or in other situations where there is a significant central government role, a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) will normally be deployed immediately to act as the primary liaison channel between departments and local responders in the local Strategic Co-ordination Centre. The GLO will normally be from the Ministry for Housing Communities and local government. In some cases, such as a terrorist or nuclear crisis, a multi-disciplinary government liaison team will support the GLO.

33. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland can provide an analogous link between the local response and the lead UK government department in reserved matters.

Enduring response structures and recovery

34. A common model for the response to enduring whole-of-system crises is to establish Strategy and Operations Cabinet committees. However, this will remain at the discretion of the Prime Minister, on the advice of the Cabinet Secretary, who may choose to decide on an alternative structure.

35. Leadership of the response will be provided by an established central structure in the Cabinet Office, headed up by a Director General or Permanent Secretary level official. The central structure will provide the secretariat function for the Cabinet committee structure and centrally co-ordinate the enduring response.

36. The Cabinet Secretary will decide and appoint the appropriate SRO to lead the taskforce, and will review whether the Crisis SRO for the acute response is suitable to take on the role for the enduring response.

37. The Government People Group will support the central or cross-government resourcing support for the new structure.

Continuity of crisis management / continuity of UK central government

38. If during the activation of COBR and use of the COBR mechanism, the primary response capability at 70 Whitehall is disrupted or denied, then the continuity of crisis management plan may be activated by the Cabinet Office.

39. During a LGD-led response, a LGD can consider the appropriateness of activating their departmental continuity of crisis management plan if a resilient alternative location is required.

40. For all emergencies requiring the activation of COBR which may compromise the ability of government to continue with its decision-making authority, the associated continuity of government plan may be activated by the Cabinet Office.

Use of emergency powers

41. Circumstances permitting, the Prime Minister in consultation with other senior ministers, and if appropriate ministers of the devolved governments, would decide on the advice of officials whether existing legislation was adequate to manage the emergency or there was a need to take emergency powers under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 if they were satisfied that the tests laid down in the Act had been met. 

Appendix D: TRAFFORD Model

42. The TRAFFORD Model acts as an aide-memoire to visualise how the Cabinet Office co-ordinates crisis management activities from the centre of government. It focuses on the response phase of the Resilience Cycle and covers the Cabinet Office’s approach to near-term preparedness, crisis response and the transition from acute response structures to enduring response and/or recovery arrangements. Figure 2 includes a description of the different components of the TRAFFORD model, while Figure 3 shows how the TRAFFORD model is employed in practice.

Figure 2: TRAFFORD Model

• Tracking - The prior identification of emerging trends, risks
• Risk reduction - Intervention ahead of crisis to prevent or mitigate
• Activation - Timely and organised acceleration of effort to achieve a response tempo
• Framing - The establishment of strategic objectives, crisis pathways and delivery models
• Facts - Data driven situational awareness and insight
• Operations - Maintenance of effective decision-making, resourcing and information flows
• Response - The identification and implementation of policy and operational recovery routes
• Development - The transition back to BAU, or bespoke structures, and learning lessons.

Figure 3: Chronological approach taken to applying the TRAFFORD mode

43. Figure 3 above illustrates how the TRAFFORD model works in practice, showing the sequencing of crisis management activities across the life-cycle of a crisis. In the pre-crisis stage, the first activity is ‘tracking’ which involves horizon scanning and risk monitoring activities to identify emerging trends and risks. Based on the understanding of emerging risks, the next step is to undertake ‘risk reduction’ activities to take the necessary interventions to prevent or mitigate a crisis. When unable to avoid a crisis, this will require ‘activation’ on the central crisis response mechanism, ensuring the necessary response structures are established and that there is an acceleration of effort to achieve a response tempo. Once activated, the response to a crisis will involve three primary activities, achieving data-driven shared situational awareness to increase the understanding of the situation (facts), the maintenance of effective decision-making, resourcing and information flows (operations), and the identification and implementation of policy and operational recovery routes to manage the consequences of the crisis, regain control, and support a return to normality (response). When effective crisis management activities have regained control of the situation, the final stage will be to transition to appropriate structures to manage longer-term activity and to ensure lessons are learnt (development). What underpins the activities articulated above is Framing, which is an iterative process which ensure objectives, crisis pathways and appropriate delivery models are established for the response to the crisis. This process should be repeated during the course of a crisis as the situation evolves and there is a requirement to re-evaluate the appropriate response.

Appendix E: Emergency management arrangements in England

44. This section provides detail on emergency management arrangements within England.

MHCLG’s Resilience and Recovery Directorate (commonly known as RED)

45. MHCLG’s RED is responsible for providing the government liaison function on resilience issues below the national level (formerly provided through government offices in the regions). The directorate works with local organisations to build resilience, to support England’s 38 local resilience forums (LRFs) working together and, as appropriate, support the response to any emergency. This includes through assisting the exchange of information between responders in affected Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs) and with UK central government. The directorate acts as a single team with resilience advisors based in offices across England providing a first point of contact for all LRFs in England.

46. RED has in place a 24/7 duty officer system which provide four functions:

• to be the mechanism for local responders to notify central government that an incident has taken place
• to obtain details of the incident and escalate if appropriate
• to inform the LGD for the incident and, if necessary, the Cabinet Office – a list of the lead government departments and incidents can be found on GOV.UK
• to act as the first point of contact within RED for the incident unless other arrangements are established by a senior member of RED staff, designated the response manager – this may mean leading on briefing or other products for ministers (or other RED customers) outside office hours

The role of the Resilience and Recovery Directorate in an emergency

47. In the event of an emergency, MHCLG will immediately take steps to support the local level emergency response, where necessary and as appropriate. This could involve any, or all, of the actions below, depending on the nature of the incident:

• establishing whether a multi-agency SCG has been set up, then establishing and maintaining immediate lines of communication with them, including identifying whether there are likely to be issues arising or capability gaps emerging which may require central government support or input
• deploying a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) once an SCG has been established, unless alternative arrangements have been agreed (other departments may also deploy GLOs depending on the nature of the incident, e.g. DfT for short straits transport issues or Home Office for terrorism related incidents) – in some circumstances, the GLO may also attend tactical co-ordinating groups and other pre-event meetings as they are held as they are held
• ensuring a strategic situation report is developed and maintained for each SCG to support the national appreciation of the situation
• where appropriate, developing and maintaining a multi-SCG situation reporting document where an incident affects a number of LRFs, or has the potential to do so, to add value to the local and/or national response
• establishing and maintaining immediate lines of communication with the LGD and the Cabinet Office – as part of this process, agreeing the level and frequency of ongoing reporting requirements from a single SCG, or multiple SCG response to feed into the national picture co-ordinated by the COBR Unit or the LGD as appropriate
• the Response Management Team in MHCLG RED operates an operations centre continuously, with resource surged to match the severity or complexity of any incidents – the operations centre provides a focal point for the collection and collation of information on the situation, a point of contact for local responders, and to engage as necessary other bodies to provide the local or multi-SCG picture to local responders and government as necessary
• working with partners to identify priorities and providing advice to the COBR Unit and LGDs to support national discussions on the deployment of scarce resources across the affected area
• facilitating mutual aid arrangements between LRFs
• assisting local responders to deliver a co-ordinated and coherent public message through sharing government’s lines to take
• be ready on request to provide information to local MPs in affected constituencies
• while the SCG is still standing, provide incident situation reports and advice to brief the LGD organising ministerial or VIP visits in consultation with local partners
• enabling the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from MHCLG RED GLOs to LGD officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any recovery co-ordinating group(s)

48. Using MHCLG RED as the main point of contact reduces the risk of duplicated requests from different central government departments, thereby minimising the burden on local responders. Where required by the scale or duration of the emergency, MHCLG RED will draw on staff and expertise from across MHCLG.

Multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Groups (ResCG)

49. While most emergencies are dealt with by local responders at a local level through SCGs, a multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened where the local response has been or may be overwhelmed and wider support is required, or where an emergency affects a number of neighbouring LRFs would benefit from co-ordination (e.g. to obtain a consistent, structured approach) or enhanced support. In situations where there are a number of concurrent incidents ongoing across England, the COBR Unit will lead on drawing together the national picture.

50. In such circumstances, MHCLG may, on its own initiative or at the request of local responders or the LGD in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a ResCG in order to bring together appropriate representatives from local resilience forums (e.g. the chair or secretariat ) where activated, or relevant organisations if not (e.g. if the incident primarily affects local authorities, then it may be appropriate for only local authorities to be represented at the ResCG). Where relevant, the membership may be augmented, including by representatives from central government departments and agencies with a regional presence (such as MOD and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency) and other agencies such as voluntary organisations, utilities and transport operators.

51. The precise role of the ResCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency. However, the role is likely to cover:

• developing a shared understanding of the evolving situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges and risks
• assessing the emergency’s actual and/or potential impact
• reviewing the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between LRF responders if required
• ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure that the national input is co-ordinated with the local effort
• co-ordinating a coherent and consistent public message
• identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at the local level and need to be raised to the national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area

52. Such meetings are most likely to be held via a tele/videoconference, though there may be occasions when a face-to-face meeting is more appropriate. The ResCG would normally be chaired by MHCLG unless otherwise agreed.  MHCLG staff would normally take the lead in confirming the form the meeting will take and attendance. They would also:

• draw up the agenda
• circulate papers and other relevant information to committee members as necessary
• provide the formal record of discussions and decisions

53. ResCGs will observe the principle of subsidiarity – whereby it is recognised that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level. The ResCG will not interfere in local command and control arrangements but will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take. Where arrangements already exist for the co-ordination of mutual aid (e.g. the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) is the mechanism for police resources), the ResCG will complement such arrangements and add value by taking a multi-agency overview.

Recovery arrangements

54. During the response phase, the LGD for Response, Cabinet Office and other relevant departments will, with input from MHCLG RED, agree what support is likely to be required by local responders during the recovery phase. This will dictate what support structures, if any, are put in place. These could include a continued presence (either physically or virtually) from a Recovery Liaison Officer(s) in the local Recovery Coordinating Group(s) performing similar functions to MHCLG RED in response. In addition, consideration will be given to the establishment of a cross-departmental ministerial recovery group (supported by an officials’ equivalent).

55. If it is agreed that ongoing national support is required, then activities during the recovery phase will be co-ordinated by the relevant LGD for Recovery.^{[footnote 4]} The role of the LGD for responsibilities will include co-ordinating cross-departmental action (via ministerial/officials’ groups as necessary) as well as providing any support to local responders (e.g. through provision of a GLO to liaise with the Recovery Co-ordinating Group).

56. In performing this role, the LGD for Recovery may call on other government departments for support, both for specialist technical / policy advice as well as local knowledge of the area / key contacts and to augment their resources. During the transition from Response to Recovery, the LGD for Recovery will also have the assistance of the MHCLG RED team to ensure a smooth handover of information, contacts and ongoing actions.

Multi-RCG Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (RecCG)

57. As in the response phase, a Multi-RCG Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RecCG) may be convened where recovery action is required across a number of neighbouring local resilience forum areas’ Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (RCGs) who would benefit from co-ordination or enhanced support.

58. In such circumstances, the LGD for Recovery may, on its own initiative or at the request of local responders, convene a RecCG in order to bring together appropriate representatives from local Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (e.g. the chair or secretariat) where activated, or relevant organisations if not (e.g. if the incident primarily affects local authorities, then it may be appropriate for only local authorities to be represented at the RecCG). As in the response phase, the membership may be augmented by representatives from other organisations as appropriate.

59. The precise role of the RecCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency. However, the role is likely to cover:

• developing a shared understanding of the situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges and risks
• assessing the impact of the emergency on the community (humanitarian), economy, infrastructure, and the environment
• reviewing the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required
• ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure that the national input is co-ordinated with the local effort
• co-ordinating a coherent and consistent public message
• identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area

60. Such meetings are most likely via a tele/videoconference, though there may be occasions when a face-to-face meeting is more appropriate. The RecCG would normally be chaired by LGD for Recovery unless otherwise agreed. LGD for Recovery staff would normally take the lead in confirming the form the meeting will take and attendance. They would also:

• draw up the agenda
• circulate papers and other relevant information to committee members as necessary
• provide the formal record of discussions and decisions

61. RecCGs will observe the principle of subsidiarity – in which it is recognised that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level. The RecCG will not interfere in local command and control arrangements but will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take.

Emergency powers

62. In the event of the use of emergency powers, for each English region to which the regulations will apply, a regional nominated co-ordinator must be appointed. For each of the devolved governments they apply to, an emergency co-ordinator must be appointed. They will also play a wider co-ordinating role.

63. There may be a requirement for a body to oversee activity in a geographic area in support of any nominated co-ordinator. In the past, this body has been known as a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee. However, due to the renaming of the national Civil Contingencies Committee and the more flexible geographic approach being taken at sub-national level, the name and composition of any such body will be agreed at the time. This will, however, build on the existing tried and tested structures of Strategic and Recovery Co-ordinating Groups and Multi-SCG/RCG groups as described above.

Appendix F: Emergency management arrangements in the devolved governments

Arrangements in Scotland

64. The Scottish Government’s Civil Contingencies Division leads on civil contingencies matters for Scotland on behalf of Scottish Ministers. The Civil Contingencies Division and Scottish responder organisations co-ordinate their activities for emergency preparation and response through a set of national arrangements and structures based on the principles of integrated emergency management – details of these arrangements are provided in the guidance to responders, Preparing Scotland. This guidance and other information on Scotland’s approach to emergencies can be found at: ​​Preparing Scotland Guidance.

65. For a major civil contingency emergency affecting Scotland, the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGORR) would activate to co-ordinate the Scottish Government’s response on behalf of Scottish Ministers.

Arrangements in Wales

66. In most cases, the response to emergencies will be undertaken at the local level by local responders, in recognition of the principle of subsidiarity. For the most severe emergencies, a co-ordinated combined government response will be essential, and the response will be supported by the Welsh Government, where the incident is within or impacts on a devolved matter.

67. The National Security and Resilience Division leads on resilience matters on behalf of Welsh ministers in Wales. This includes overseeing and delivering the Welsh Government’s crisis management arrangements (from first response to activation of the Emergency Coordination Centre (Wales)).  This includes central co-ordination of work across the Welsh Government to provide Welsh ministers and senior officials with situational awareness, as well as liaising with responders in Wales, the four Welsh local resilience forums, and the UK government. The Welsh Government’s strategic response structure is provided below.

Figure 4: Crisis management to support response and recovery in Wales

68. Figure 4 shows the hierarchy of crisis management structures in Welsh Government, with 4 levels: Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum. Platinum represents the apex of the crisis command structures, with all of the levels feeding into one another. The four levels detail the following:

• Bronze – Officials’ co-ordination group: co-ordination of information and intelligence, and analysis and management of operational policy to support compilation of situation reports and associated strategic assessments made by silver, gold and platinum groups.
• Silver (Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)) – Senior officials’ strategic group: brings together relevant senior Welsh Government leaders (officials) to develop an overall picture of the situation and to identify and direct actions to support the local response, managing emerging risks and consequences, and to advise and inform ministers.
• Gold – Permanent secretary and DG oversight group: responsible for the strategic oversight of the strategy, policy, risk management, corporate matters and assurance. During an emergency, ExCo can provide advice and support decision-making on strategic matters, direct resources within Welsh Government to critical areas as needed, and support the flow of information to ministers and decision-makers. Platinum – Ministerial oversight group: holds ultimate responsibility for the Welsh Government’s response to the most serious emergencies or national crises, and sets the strategic approach for the Welsh Government’s support for response and recovery. Ministers, typically those with portfolio responsibilities for affected sectors, and functions of most relevance to the incident, convene to consider the situation and to take any decisions that may be necessary to support response and recovery. Decisions may be deferred to Cabinet and/or the First Minister depending on the situation.

69. The National Security and Resilience Division will be the single point of contact with COBR, with lead policy departments engaging with their respective LGD in the UK government.

70. In a major emergency, the Pan-Wales Response Plan can be activated. This plan sets out the arrangements for the pan-Wales level integration of the Welsh response to an emergency in or affecting Wales. It reflects the principles of response contained in the non-statutory guidance Emergency Response and Recovery which supports the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.^{[footnote 5]} The plan sets out co-ordination arrangements rather than a pan-Wales command structure. It primarily provides a framework for the management of an emergency affecting several or all areas of Wales.  It can also be implemented in response to a major incident in one local resilience forum area.

71. In a major emergency, in line with the Pan-Wales Response Plan, the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee will convene and will develop an overall picture, identify and direct actions to support the local response, manage emerging risks and consequences and advise and inform Welsh ministers.

72. The Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC) is an advisory body comprising senior departmental representatives of the Welsh Government and senior experts from Category 1 and 2 responders and others who can best assess and advise on a particular emergency affecting Wales. A WCCC can be called by the Welsh Government at the request of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group, partner agency or COBR.

73. The role of the WCCC will be:

• to maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation within Wales, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management
• to support the Home Office Government Liaison team at the SCG in response to terrorist incidents, primarily on consequence management issues
• to assess and advise on any issues which cannot be resolved at a local level and which may need to be raised at a UK level
• to advise on the deployment of scarce resources across Wales by identifying pan-Wales priorities
• to advise on the use of existing legislation and, in some cases, to consider the use of additional powers through the UK government

74. The Emergency Coordination Centre (Wales)’s role is primarily one of information gathering and keeping ministers informed of the implications of emergencies in Wales. At the same time, it keeps Strategic Co-ordinating Groups and individual agencies informed about developments at the UK level which will affect them. It will also offer assistance, where possible, to SCGs, particularly in respect of consequence management and recovery issues.

75. The role of the Emergency Coordination Centre (Wales) will be to:

• co-ordinate the gathering and dissemination of information across Wales
• ensure an effective flow of communication between local, pan-Wales and UK levels, including the co-ordination of reports to the UK level on the response and recovery effort
• brief the lead official and WCCC
• ensure that the UK input to response is co-ordinated with the local and pan-Wales efforts
• provide media and community relations support through the Welsh Government Communications Division
• assist, where required, the Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in the consequence management of the emergency and recovery planning
• facilitate mutual aid arrangements within Wales and where necessary, between Wales and the border areas of England
• raise to a UK level any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or Wales level

76/. Where appropriate, the Welsh Government may activate the Emergency Coordination Centre facilities to enable Category 1 responders and all affected Welsh Government policy leads to co-locate. 

Arrangements in Northern Ireland

77/. Civil contingencies in Northern Ireland is largely a devolved matter, with functions being exercised routinely by the Northern Ireland departments. Some functions are not devolved and are delivered in Northern Ireland by bodies that fall within the remit of the UK government.

Summary of devolved and reserved/excepted matters

Devolved	Reserved/excepted (UK government)
Health and social services	Foreign policy
Agriculture and fisheries	Defence
Justice and policing	National security
Education	Constitution
Social security, pensions and child support	Financial services, markets and pensions regulation
Economic development	UK-wide taxation
Employment and skills	International treaties and trade
Environmental issues, including planning	Nationality, immigration and asylum
NI Civil Service	Nuclear energy
Culture and sport	Navigation and civil aviation
Local government	Telecommunications and postage
Equal opportunities	Import and export controls
Housing	Elections
NI transport policies

78. The Northern Ireland Executive plays a lead role in non-terrorism related emergencies in or affecting Northern Ireland. At the Northern Ireland level, the strategic response can be provided by the Northern Ireland departments, the emergency services and the Northern Ireland Office (Northern Ireland Related Terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related only). Arrangements are in place to trigger lead departments or the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) as appropriate in response to actual or anticipated emergencies, and to scale up the level of co-ordination if the situation demands it.

79. The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework – Building Resilience Together details the levels and natures of response for emergencies which occur in Northern Ireland from the tactical to the strategic level. It sets out the Northern Ireland arrangements for effective emergency management, identifying the processes involved in preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies. It also lays out the levels of response and the associated command, control and co-ordination arrangements to manage any ongoing incident and any recovery thereafter, including to support the triggering of and subsequent support of NICCMA. The framework also formally embeds the integrated emergency management approach, JESIP Principles and the Joint Decision Model across the entire resilience network in Northern Ireland.

80. In most cases, the response to emergencies in Northern Ireland will be conducted at the local level by local responders or by the SCG in a Level 1 emergency. NICCMA is invoked when an emergency occurs which is likely to have a serious strategic impact to all or part of Northern Ireland. That escalation enables Northern Ireland-wide co-ordination both within and outside of Northern Ireland. In such instances, it is likely that the emergency has or threatens to cause serious damage to human welfare, the environment or the security of Northern Ireland or the UK as a whole. It is likely therefore that only Level 2 and Level 3 emergencies will require activation of NICCMA.

81. Once NICCMA is invoked, the Civil Contingencies Group (Officials) will be activated with membership at Permanent Secretary level. Civil Contingencies Group (Officials) is the default group with Civil Contingencies Group (Ministers) only meeting if ministers decide it is necessary. On behalf of the Northern Ireland Executive, Civil Contingencies Group (Officials) will provide executive level direction to the response but will discharge strategic co-ordination to a SCG. Civil Contingencies Group (Officials) is supported by the Northern Ireland HUB.

82. The Northern Ireland HUB is an enhanced information fusion centre which centrally co-ordinates information during an emergency response, across all Northern Ireland departments and key partners, providing situational awareness to enhance decision-making at all levels, primarily Civil Contingencies Group (Officials) and the Northern Ireland Executive, if required. The Northern Ireland HUB can deal with single or concurrent issues and provides one single source of cross-departmental, cross-Northern Ireland impact and situational awareness to Civil Contingencies Group (Officials). The Northern Ireland HUB is designed to maximise information flow into and out of Northern Ireland, including to the CRIP, it is not a decision-making body.

83. The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) is the LGD for terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland arising from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism, including a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incident. A terrorist attack in Northern Ireland relating to non-Northern Ireland Related Terrorism such as Islamist or Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism would see the Home Office assume responsibility as the LGD, working closely with the Northern Ireland Office, and with the relevant Northern Ireland department(s). A Northern Ireland Related Terrorism attack in mainland Great Britain would also be led by the Home Office with appropriate assistance from the Northern Ireland Office. The Northern Ireland Office may deploy a liaison officer to assist at the Strategic Co-ordinating Group/Gold Command location.

84. For consequence management and recovery issues arising from terrorist events and for all other Level 1 to 3 emergencies, the devolved government will have LGD responsibility and will co-ordinate their response through lead departments or the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) as appropriate. Throughout such incidents, the Northern Ireland Office will participate in the NICCMA and other co-ordination groups as necessary.

85. NIOBR will be the single point of contact to COBR for counter-terrorist matters, but where there are significant (potential) consequence management and recovery assessments, the devolved government will need to carry out parallel reporting. Where the emergency is civil, the devolved government will lead in reporting to COBR. The nature of the Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Related Terrorism or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incident management response and any coordination with COBR will depend on the nature and level of any emergency affecting Northern Ireland, and whether said emergency affects Northern Ireland only or is multi-sited. This ranges from the Northern Ireland Office seeking support from COBR by way of expertise and/or national assets in the event of a serious emergency affecting only Northern Ireland, to the Northern Ireland Office managing the local response, coordinating with COBR, in the event of a serious Northern Ireland Related Terrorism or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergency affecting Northern Ireland and other parts of the UK.

86. The Northern Ireland Office will lead in any cross-border counter-terrorist emergencies, although the LGD, the Executive Office, or the Northern Ireland HUB if activated, will liaise with their opposite numbers in the Republic of Ireland on relevant consequence management and recovery issues.

87. For all other non-terrorism related emergencies, the LGD, or the Executive Office, will take the lead in the consequence management/oversight of the response within Northern Ireland, this will include non-terrorism related cross-border emergencies.

88. Agencies/bodies which are not devolved will report as normal to their respective UK department (e.g. military to Ministry of Defence etc.) However, they will also copy any reports about the developing situation in Northern Ireland from their agency’s perspective to the Northern Ireland HUB, the Executive Office and/or LGD where appropriate. Each organisation will need to consider the extent to which it is appropriate to share information with the Northern Ireland HUB, the Executive Office and/or LGD for security purposes, but will wish to ensure that sufficient information is supplied to allow a Northern Ireland-wide strategic picture to be established for the relevant response structures.

89. The Executive Information Service will co-ordinate the communications strategy for any emergencies affecting Northern Ireland.

Appendix G Working with the devolved governments in crisis response

90. This appendix summarises the key principles and arrangements set out in the Amber Book for how UK government works with the devolved governments when responding to crises which require engagement between UK government and the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and/or the Northern Ireland Executive.

Emergency management in the UK

91. The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004, and accompanying non-legislative measures, delivers a single framework for civil protection in the UK. Many of the organisations which have duties under the CCA 2004 use devolved powers to fulfil them, for example policing, local government, transport or health. As such, the delivery of much of the planning for, response to and recovery from emergencies taking place in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is ultimately the responsibility of the devolved governments.

92. The UK’s civil contingencies framework operates on the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that most emergencies in the UK are handled at the local level by the emergency services, local authorities and other relevant organisations such as utility companies and transport operators in line with their legal obligations under the CCA 2004. However, because of scale or complexity, some emergencies need a degree of central government coordination or support, with the UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and/or Northern Ireland Executive taking the lead where appropriate in accordance with devolution agreements.

93. Responsibility for the preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies taking place in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will depend on whether the subject is reserved or devolved. Each government’s competency depends on the terms of its devolution settlement, which is different for each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Where an:

• issue is devolved (such as flood defence), the government in that nation leads prevention, preparation, crisis response and recovery for these areas
• issue in a devolved policy area spans across administrative borders, the relevant devolved governments and the UK government will work together to respond and recover
• issue is a reserved matter, the UK LGD will work closely with the devolved governments where appropriate, recognising that wider consequence management is devolved – for example, managing the risk of disruption to the Great British energy network would be led by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), but responsibility for some of the secondary impacts of this risk (for example, the impact of energy failure on schools) is devolved

94. The UK government uses a LGD Model, where designated LGDs, with support of other departments and bodies, have responsibilities for leading work to identify serious risks and ensuring that the right planning, response and recovery arrangements are in place. These responsibilities apply UK-wide where a matter is reserved. Where a matter is devolved, LGDs have responsibilities in accordance with relevant devolution settlements. As such, the LGD model is not directly replicated in the devolved governments, who have different governance arrangements for their planning and response work.

95. In reality, crises and emergencies do not respect borders or policy areas and a partnership approach between all parts of the UK is essential to ensure we can effectively respond to risks, wherever in the UK they occur.

Principles of working between UK government and the devolved governments

96. The ways of working between UK government and the devolved governments are founded on the principles for intergovernmental relations, which are: ^{[footnote 6]}

• maintaining positive and constructive relations, based on mutual respect for the responsibilities of the governments and their shared role in the governance of the UK – this should include close consideration for how the devolution settlements impact the response to a crisis, ensuring that devolution settlements are respected, due consideration is given to the interaction of devolved and reserved levers, and having a UK-wide appreciation of impacts where there are cross-border implications to a crisis
• building and maintaining trust, based on effective communication – this should involve close co-ordination between the UK government and the devolved government(s) when responding to crises which have cross-border implications, including invitations to respective crisis response meetings and the deployment of liaison officers to facilitate effective communication between respective response structures
• sharing information (with due consideration to separate agreements on data sharing) and respecting confidentiality as appropriate – this should include best efforts to share information and data during joint responses to enhance shared situational awareness
• promoting understanding of, and accountability for, their intergovernmental activity – in the context of crisis management, officials should have an understanding of the implications of the devolution agreements on crisis response and the respective crisis structures of the UK government and the devolved governments and how they interact
• resolving disputes according to a clear and agreed process – where possible this would involve officials in the UK government and the relevant devolved government(s) taking active steps to avoid disagreements and collaborate to reach common solutions, but using pre-established mechanisms for dispute resolution as overseen by the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat where not possible

97. These principles provide the foundation for productive relations, based on mutual respect and trust, respecting the reserved powers of the UK government and Parliament and the devolved competences of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government, Northern Ireland Executive and their legislatures.

98. It is supported by memorandums of understanding and concordats between the UK government and relevant devolved governments.^{[footnote 7]}

99. These principles and understandings of ways of working should provide the foundation for taking a Four Nations approach to handling emergency situations which have UK-wide impacts.

100. Officials working in civil contingencies roles in UK government should understand how devolution affects arrangements for responding to emergencies in the UK in their risk areas and the civil contingency structures used by the devolved governments.^{[footnote 8]},^{[footnote 9]} They should also understand and be clear on the application of measures and where they apply. For example, on whether an announced policy by UK government only applies in England or across the wider UK.

Arrangements for how UK government works with the devolved governments

Matter is devolved and doesn’t have cross-border implications

101. Where a crisis takes place in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland for a matter which is devolved, the impacted devolved governments will activate their own response structures to lead their response effort. In certain circumstances, the relevant devolved government may request support from the UK government, just as the UK government can request support from the devolved governments. For example, extensive flooding may overwhelm available resources of a devolved government and they can request further support from the UK government. Such requests would typically be channelled through the relevant territorial office or directly with the relevant UK government department. Even in crises relating to issues in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland which are devolved, there may be circumstances where the UK government provides support using reserved levers which interact with or enable devolved lever actions.

Matter is devolved with cross-border implications

102. Where a crisis in a devolved policy area spans across administrative borders, the UK government and relevant devolved government(s) will lead response within their own respective territories in accordance with their own response arrangements, but will take steps to establish close partnerships and co-ordinate an effective response. For less severe crises, where the UK government response is being handled through the LGD’s response structure, the relevant LGD would be expected to engage the relevant devolved governments and vice versa to ensure an effective and joined-up response, establishing links between respective response structures and coordinating response activity where appropriate.

103. Where COBR crisis management arrangements have been entered into, Cabinet Office would typically enact the following arrangements:

• activate established links with the civil contingencies structure in the devolved government
• invite devolved government(s) ministers and officials to relevant meetings, including COBR where appropriate – this would typically be the case where the crisis impacts, or has the potential to impact, the devolved government
• where appropriate, request situation reports from the devolved government to feed into the development of the CRIP to ensure a UK-wide appreciation of the situation
• where appropriate, situational awareness products would be shared with devolved government(s) to ensure a shared situational awareness – this would typically be the case when there is a benefit in having a joint understanding of impacts being felt across the UK
• actively look to support the co-ordination of response activities where appropriate to ensure a joined-up approach is taken to managing consequences which impact multiple parts of the UK
• deploy a liaison officer, if required, to represent UK government ministers’ views and facilitate the exchange of information and likewise host devolved government liaison officers
• if required, assist in the liaison with any other countries impacted by the crisis, e.g. the Irish Government
• engage on public communication strategies to, where possible, achieve consistency in public messaging – the devolved governments will co-ordinate, as appropriate, with the public communications strategies of local responders in their area

Matter is reserved

104. For a crisis which impacts Scotland, Wales, and/or Northern Ireland related to a reserved matter, the UK government would lead the response to the reserved matter, working closely with the relevant devolved government(s) who would respond to consequences which are devolved. In such instances, both the UK government and the devolved government(s) would enact their own civil contingencies arrangements to co-ordinate their contribution to the response.

105. In response to less severe crises relating to a reserved matter, the relevant LGD from the UK government would lead the response through their own response structures, working closely with the impacted devolved governments who would respond to consequences which are devolved. In such instances, the UK government LGD would be responsible for liaising closely with local responders on the reserved matter and the relevant devolved government in relation to wider consequence management to ensure an effective co-ordinated response.

106. For more severe crises, where COBR crisis management arrangements have been activated, Cabinet Office would typically enact the following arrangements:

• activate established links with the civil contingencies structure in the devolved government
• inviting devolved government(s) ministers and officials to relevant meetings, including COBR where appropriate
• where appropriate, requesting situation reports from the devolved government(s) to feed into the development of the CRIP to ensure a UK-wide appreciation of the situation
• where possible, situational awareness products would be shared with devolved government(s) to ensure a shared situational awareness
• supporting close working between the LGD for the reserved matter and the impacted devolved government(s), to ensure coherent consequence management for both devolved and reserved matters
• engaging on public communication strategies to support the co-ordination of messaging whenever there are devolved aspects to the response
• representatives from the devolved governments may also where appropriate be deployed to the COBR response structure and vice versa

Territorial impact vs competency	Issue is reserved	Issue is devolved
Issue impacts devolved government territory only	- Cabinet Office/LGD lead on core (reserved) issue. - Devolved government leads on management of wider impacts (feeding into Cabinet Office/LGD structures).	- Devolved government leads on core issue and management of wider impacts.
Issue has cross-border implications	- Cabinet Office/LGD lead on core (reserved) issue - Devolved government leads on management of wider impacts within devolved government territory (feeding into Cabinet Office/LGD structures). - Devolved government co-ordinates with Cabinet Office/LGD on cross-border wider impacts.	- Devolved government leads on core issue and management of wider impacts within devolved government territory. - Devolved government co-ordinates with Cabinet Office/LGD on cross-border impacts.

Role of the territorial offices

107. The territorial offices consist of the Scotland Office, the Wales Office and the Northern Ireland Office, all of which are UK government departments. They represent the UK government’s interests in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the UK government.

108. Territorial offices play an important role in facilitating partnership between UK government and the devolved governments, given their close relationships and knowledge of both UK government and the relevant devolved government.

109. Territorial offices can support effective collaboration between the UK government and the relevant devolved government, and can support with effective liaison and handling of particular issues. They can provide support and advice to UK government departments when working with the devolved governments, and should be included when UK government departments engage directly with the devolved governments.

110. Where devolved governments are looking to submit a request for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA), this request must be channelled through the relevant territorial office to submit on their behalf.

111. It is critical that the distinction between the roles of the devolved governments and the territorial offices are clearly understood across UK government departments.  Care must be taken when requesting briefing, delivering briefing or seeking a view that either both the devolved government and the territorial office are consulted at the same time or, if appropriate, the consultation is strictly within the remit of the single organisation contacted. This is particularly critical in regard to public communication which should be clear on the application of measures and where they apply.

Key considerations for effective joint working

112. Where there are cross-border implications to an emergency, there are a number of key considerations which should underpin the response:

• Territorial extent: advice and policy formulation during a crisis needs to consider the territorial extent of the policy, and ensure that this is clear in public communications.
• Understanding interdependencies: policies and levers related to reserved matters can impact decision-making in the devolved governments regarding devolved matters. It is critical that UK government departments take time to understand the possible implications of their decisions on the devolved government(s), and engage the relevant devolved government(s) sufficiently to understand impacts and to take a co-ordinated approach.
• Information sharing: where possible, information should be shared between UK government and the relevant devolved governments to support shared situational awareness and build a UK-wide appreciation of impacts. Where information is shared, confidentiality should be respected as appropriate.
• Legislation: emergencies can necessitate the need to draft new primary legislation to provide UK government with the required legislative powers to manage the consequences of the crisis. It is possible that the Bill is then introduced and fast-tracked through Parliament on an expedited timetable. Engagement with devolved governments would be required to expedite any devolved legislative processes.
• Emergency powers: emergency powers under the Act are a reserved matter. Devolved governments must be consulted if the emergency regulations will apply to Scotland, Wales and/or Northern Ireland, unless urgency prevents this. Emergency regulations should be tailored to the devolution settlements, where relevant. While the LGD will be responsible for drafting and making the emergency regulations in consultation with the devolved governments, the territorial offices have overall responsibility for consultation with the devolved governments and ensuring they are kept informed and involved.
• MACA: devolved governments can make MACA requests, which should be channelled through their respective territorial office to submit on their behalf.^{[footnote 10]}
• Governance: where appropriate, ministers and officials from the relevant devolved government(s) will be invited to meetings as part of UK government’s established command, control and co-ordination (C3) structure. In certain instances, it may be more appropriate for the devolved governments to be engaged through the structures detailed in the ‘Review of intergovernmental relations’.
• Funding: in a crisis, the UK government funds responses in reserved policy areas across the UK, while devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland manage and fund responses in devolved areas through their budgets. If funding through existing budgets or funding is insufficient in the devolved governments, HM Treasury can agree to changes or flexibilities to devolved government funding arrangements. Devolved government should consider their funding needs and engage with HM Treasury to request changes to existing funding arrangements.

Appendix H: Arrangements in the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies

Arrangements in the Overseas Territories

113. There are 14 UK Overseas Territories:

• Anguilla
• Bermuda
• British Antarctic Territory
• British Indian Ocean Territory
• British Virgin Islands
• Cayman Islands
• Falkland Islands
• Gibraltar
• Montserrat
• Pitcairn Islands
• St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha
• South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
• Sovereign Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia
• Turks and Caicos Islands

Relationship with the United Kingdom

114. The UK government has a collective responsibility for the Overseas Territories and associated contingent liabilities, this includes responsibilities for the security and good governance of Overseas Territories. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) supports the administration of these responsibilities (with the exception of the Sovereign Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which are led by the Ministry of Defence), working with UK government departments.

115. It is an established principle that UK government departments lead support to the governments of Overseas Territories on matters within their fields of expertise, e.g. the Department for Transport leads on Overseas Territories aviation and maritime safety and security, working closely with the FCDO and Governors on any political aspects.

116. The relationship between the Overseas Territories and the UK is unique. Each Officer Administering the Government – Governor, Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Commissioner or Administrator – is responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, through them, to His Majesty the King and the UK government, for the security and proper governance of the Territory. An administrator’s line of responsibility runs through the Governor. The UK relationship with an Overseas Territory is quite different from that of an independent state. No territory is constitutionally part of the UK and each is administered separately to the others.

117. The degree of self-government enjoyed by an Overseas Territory depends on its stage of constitutional development. Bermuda has almost full internal self-government, with a Premier presiding over a Cabinet. The situation is similar in Gibraltar where the Chief Minister is head of the internal government, while the Governor deals largely with external affairs. By contrast in Ascension, Tristan da Cunha and Pitcairn the Governor is the law-making authority.

118. All Overseas Territories have Governors, except for British Indian Ocean Territory, British Antarctic Territory and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which have Commissioners (the former two are FCDO officials based in London, the Falkland Islands Governor is the Commissioner for South Georgia). Governors are appointed by and represent His Majesty the King. The Governor both represents His Majesty in the Territory and represents the Territory’s interests to the UK government in London. In most Overseas Territories, the Governor retains special responsibility for defence, external affairs, internal security, police and the public service. In some cases, this extends to other functions, for example international financial services (Anguilla, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands) and shipping and finance, (St Helena). On all other issues Governors are normally bound to accept the advice Cabinet (or equivalent), except where reserve powers are exercised.

119. The majority of UK Overseas Territory nationals have the right to a British passport and have the right of abode in the UK.

Emergency planning and support

120. Each Overseas Territory has a unique hazard profile and vulnerability to a breadth of threats. Several of the Overseas Territories are particularly vulnerable to high-impact natural hazard events (hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes). A number of human hazards may also pose significant issue (e.g. loss or breakdown of critical national infrastructure, major oil spill, mass casualty incidents). Disaster and emergency management is a devolved responsibility, and under this Overseas Territories are expected to lead local preparedness for and response to crises. Major incidents can overwhelm local capacity and capability.

121. When there is a crisis that significantly threatens or impacts the safety, security or wellbeing of an Overseas Territory, the UK government has a duty to act to support the government of the Overseas Territory to respond effectively. For major events, the FCDO typically acts as the LGD in the UK, co-ordinating action and calling on the leadership of other UK government departments in their respective fields of expertise. Response work is focused on enabling needs to be met locally, where possible. In the event Overseas Territory residents are evacuated to the UK after a disaster, they would come under the remit of the relevant UK authority and not the FCDO.

122. It is important for UK government departments to engage in planning and preparedness activities in support of the Overseas Territories to both build Overseas Territory capacity, capability and resilience, and be ready to respond effectively in partnership when disasters do occur.

Arrangements in the Crown Dependencies

123. The Crown Dependencies are self-governing dependencies of the Crown.  Together with the UK they constitute the ‘British Islands’, as defined in the Interpretation Act 1978, schedule 1.

124. The 3 Crown Dependencies are:

• the Bailiwick of Jersey
• the Bailiwick of Guernsey, which itself comprises of 3 separate jurisdictions:
  • Guernsey (which includes the islands of Herm and Jethou)
  • Alderney
  • Sark (which includes the island of Brecqhou)
• the Isle of Man

Relationship with the UK

125. The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependencies of the Crown. This means they have their own directly elected legislative assemblies, governments, administrative, fiscal and legal systems. The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament and have a different constitutional position to that of the British Overseas Territories but, like the Overseas Territories, the UK is their sovereign State.

126. The constitutional relationship of the Crown Dependencies with the UK is maintained through the Crown and is not enshrined in a single formal constitutional document (although a statement of the wider relationship, and obligations towards each other, can be found in Part XI of Volume 1 of the 1973 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, known as the Kilbrandon Report) as the relationship is largely governed by constitutional convention.

127. HM Government is responsible for the defence (and certain national security matters including the work of the intelligence services) and the international relations of the Crown Dependencies. The Crown is also ultimately responsible for ensuring their good government. The Crown acts through the Privy Council on the recommendation of ministers in their capacity as Privy Councillors. The Crown’s powers over the islands are therefore effectively exercised through HM Government. Further information on the constitutional relationship, including a copy of the Kilbrandon Report, can be found in the Ministry of Justice Crown Dependencies guidance page.

128. The King is the Head of State of each Island, and the Lieutenant Governor for each Crown Dependency is His Majesty’s personal representative. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice is the Privy Counsellor with special responsibility for Island affairs and is supported by a Ministry of Justice minister who is responsible for the conduct of Crown Dependency business within Whitehall.

129. The British Nationality Act 1981 confers British Citizenship on all those with close connections with the UK, the Channel Islands and Isle of Man. The Crown Dependencies use the common format passport, and the respective Lieutenant Governor is the passport-issuing authority in each of the Crown Dependencies. The UK, the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland comprise the Common Travel Area. There is no immigration control between the UK and the Crown Dependencies, or between the Crown Dependencies themselves. Rather, the Islands form part of the border for the British Isles as a whole.

130. The Crown Dependencies are responsible for their own domestic affairs and do not receive funding from the UK Exchequer (the Crown Dependencies also make annual voluntary contributions towards the costs of their defence and international representation by the UK). The UK may provide assistance on domestic matters at the Crown Dependencies’ request, and, in such cases, the Crown Dependencies normally cover relevant costs. The UK has an obligation to give all reasonable assistance to the Crown Dependencies, to respect their autonomy and to work for their preservation. The Crown Dependencies also have an obligation to give all reasonable assistance and co-operation to UK authorities in the exercise of their domestic and international responsibilities.

131. There is a longstanding constitutional convention that the UK does not intervene in areas of the Crown Dependencies own domestic responsibility without their consent other than in very limited circumstances. HM Government would only look to do so as a last resort but in circumstances such as a grave breakdown or failure in the administration of justice or civil order, here the residual prerogative power of the Crown could be used to intervene in the internal affairs of the Crown Dependencies.

132. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for managing the UK’s overarching constitutional relationship with the Crown Dependencies but all UK government departments/agencies are responsible for their respective policy areas towards the Crown Dependencies and should engage directly with them.

Emergency planning and support

133. The Crown Dependencies are responsible for their own emergency planning and responses, but the UK government should provide the Crown Dependencies with as much information and support as is reasonable in order that they may appropriately plan for and react to emergencies affecting their jurisdictions.

134. The governments of Crown Dependencies have their own emergency planning leads, and their authorities are accustomed to dealing with most types of small scale emergencies with little outside help. The Crown Dependencies have also established relationships with appropriate regional UK authorities (in the South West in the case of the Channel Islands, and the North West for the Isle of Man – this includes relevant local resilience forums). The Crown Dependencies also participate in some regional level contingency planning exercises.

135. Upon request, the UK should also look to provide relevant reasonable assistance to the Crown Dependencies in responding to emergencies (the question of whether/what assistance is reasonable will depend on the nature of the emergency). Such requests will go normally directly from the Crown Dependencies to appropriate UK government departments/agencies for assessment and decision-making. The Ministry of Justice Crown Dependencies team, responsible for the UK’s wider constitutional relationship with the Crown Dependencies, does not have an active role in urgent assistance request processes/decisions but should be advised and updated.

136. Examples of situations where support from the UK might be required include, but are not limited to:

• a major incident, where there is a need to protect human life, property and alleviate distress
• animal disease outbreaks or public health epidemics
• criminal or terrorist activity
• bomb disposal
• protecting territorial waters or airspace

137. Defence can, and does, contribute to certain resilience operations in the UK and Crown Dependencies through the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) process. MACA operations conducted in the Crown Dependencies involve the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or the Crown Dependency civil authority. These operations are subject to Defence ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event, except in immediate risk of life situations. Military assistance is authorised in accordance with doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 02 – JDP-02 (PDF, 4.1MB)) and the powers to deploy service personnel derive from the Royal Prerogative, the Emergency Powers Act 1964 or emergency regulations made under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 depending on the nature and location of the task required. However, as the Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK and are not subject to, or bound by, CCA 2004, in the event that Defence assets are requested by a Crown Dependency, this will be co-ordinated through the Ministry of Justice acting as the LGD. Requests for Defence support may arise from: ‘top down’, where the request originates from central government, or ‘bottom up’, where the request will be made by civil authorities at the local Crown Dependency level. This latter process is usually undertaken in conjunction with Defence Regional Liaison Officers to shape and enable the request.

138. UK policing support can also be requested and provided to the Crown Dependencies under section 26 of the Police Act 1996, Crown Dependencies requests are sent to relevant UK police forces and then passed to the International Police Assistance Service team in the Home Office that authorise section 26 requests.

139. Other types of assistance requests will go from the Crown Dependencies to appropriate UK government departments/agencies for assessment and decision-making.

140. Relevant officials in the governments of the Crown Dependencies are included on the circulation lists used by UK government departments to disseminate emergency information (e.g. notices issued by Defra in connection with foot and mouth disease and avian influenza).

141. In the unlikely event of UK COBR activating in response to an incident in the Crown Dependencies, Cabinet Office will decide in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, the Prime Minister’s Office and other relevant departments who should chair in light of the circumstances at the time, relevant representatives/officials from the Crown Dependencies may also be invited to attend as appropriate.

Glossary of terms

Primary term	Acronym/abbreviation	Definition
Accountable (person)		Someone who is accountable is required and expected to justify actions or decisions to a person or body with greater authority, from whom the accountability has been formally assigned.
Activation		The structured process of moving into crisis response arrangements.
Acute risk		Time-bound, discrete events, for example a major fire or a terrorist attack.
Acute phase		Onset of an event, characterised by accelerated demands on the system and inherent uncertainty, necessitating urgent decision-making and action to regain control and respond to immediate impact.
Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms	COBR	Refers to the facility and central crisis management arrangements which provide the strategic co-ordination mechanism through which the UK government responds quickly to major emergencies that require urgent collective decision-making (as set out in the Amber Book).
Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms Response Director		Individual with the overall responsibility for the COBR response structure. They will work in support of the Crisis Senior Responsible Owner, to support the co-ordination of the central government response.
Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms response structure	COBR response structure	The structure within Cabinet Office established when COBR crisis management arrangements are entered into, which has responsibility for co-ordinating central government crisis response activity and providing the secretariat function for COBR meetings.
Calling notice		The official email invitation sent to those required to attend a meeting. It will include details of the title of the meeting, location, timing and whether it is in person or virtual. It will often also request confirmation that the invitee will attend and confirmation of their clearances.
Cascading impact		This term refers to the knock-on impacts of an event that cause further physical, social or economic disruption. For example, severe weather could cause flooding, which then causes damage to electricity infrastructure, resulting in a power outage which then disrupts communications service providers.
Category 1 responders		A person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These bodies are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies. As such, they are subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act.
Category 2 responders		A person or body listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These are co-operating responders who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to co-operate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.
Chief of Staff	CoS	The individual with the on the day responsibility safe and effective operation of the Departmental Operations Centre.
Chronic risk		Continuous challenges which gradually erode our economy, community, way of life and/or national security.
Civil Contingencies Act 2004	CCA	Act of 2004 which established a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom. Part 1 of the Act establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for local responders; Part 2 of the Act establishes emergency powers.
Civil contingencies forward look		The primary source of cross-government assessments of potential civil emergency risks and disruptive challenges over a 6-month period, drawing from a wealth of departmental expertise and horizon scanning.
Collective responsibility		The principle that decisions made by Cabinet or Cabinet committees are binding on all government ministers, save where collective agreement is explicitly set aside.
Command		The exercise of vested authority that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives.
Command, control and co-ordination	C3	Structures that will be used to co-ordinate response activities and form the basis of decision-making, based on the concepts of command, control and co-ordination.
Commonly Recognised Information Picture	CRIP	A single, authoritative strategic overview of a crisis that is developed according to a standard template and is intended for briefing and decision-support purposes at COBR meetings.
Concurrent		The fact of two or more events or circumstances happening or existing at the same time, during which they may have to alternately share common resources.
Contingency plan		A plan, developed in advance, which details actions designed to respond to a potential future event based on planning assumptions for how the situation might unfold.
Contingency planning		A management process that analyses risks and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses.
Control		The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives.
Co-ordination		The integration of multi-organisation efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives.
Crisis		In the Amber Book, the terms crisis and emergency are used interchangeably.
Crisis management		Co-ordinated activities to lead, direct and control an organisation with regard to crisis.
Crisis Senior Responsible Officer	CSRO	The Crisis SRO is the principal adviser to the Lead Minister and COBR and has overall responsibility for the strategic co-ordination of the central government response. They are accountable to the Lead Minister for delivering the response in line with ministerial direction and collective decisions made at COBR.
Daily rhythm		An agreed daily cycle of response activities, including meetings and reporting deadlines, to support the synchronisation of current and future operations.
Data snapshot		A resource produced by the National Situation Centre which provides a concise overview of the situation at a given point.
Department lead		The official with overall responsibility for the strategy of a crisis response within a department/organisation.
Departmental Operations Centre	DOC	A centre within a department that set up to co-ordinate their department’s contribution to an emergency response.
Devolved governments		The Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive.
Devolved matter		Devolved matters are those areas of government where decision-making has been delegated by Parliament to the devolved institutions such as the Scottish Parliament, the Assemblies of Wales, Northern Ireland and London or to local authorities.
Disruptive event		Occurrence or change that interrupts planned activities, operations or functions, whether anticipated or unanticipated.
Early warning system		An integrated system of risk monitoring, forecasting and prediction, risk assessment, communication and preparedness activities, systems and processes that enables individuals, communities, governments, businesses and others to take timely action to reduce risks in advance of an event.
Emergency		An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare, or to the environment; or to national security.
Emergency Alert		A UK government service that can be used to warn the public of a threat that represents an imminent threat to life.
Emergency powers		Last-resort option for responding to the most serious of emergencies where existing powers are insufficient, and additional powers are enacted under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and elsewhere.
Emergency regulations		Temporary legislation used as a last resort in the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way.
Enduring phase		The stage where the situation has stabilised, but the issue continues to pose an enduring challenge that erodes the economy, community, way of life, and/or national security over a longer timeframe.
Event		Occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances.
Exercise		A process to train for, assess, practice and improve performance in an organisation. A simulation designed to validate organisations’ capability to manage incidents and emergencies. Specifically, exercises will seek to validate training undertaken and the procedures and systems within emergency or business continuity plans.
Government Chief Scientific Adviser	GCSA	The official responsible for providing scientific advice to the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, advising the government on aspects of policy on science and technology, as well as ensuring and improving the quality and use of scientific evidence and advice in government.
Government Liaison Officer	GLO	The one point of contact between emergency responders at the local level, and central government. In some cases, such as a terrorist or nuclear emergency the LGD may deploy the GLO, and RED will support as a consequence management Liaison Officer as part of a multidisciplinary Government Liaison team.
Government Liaison team	GLT	Central government, multidisciplinary team, led by the Government Liaison Officer, dispatched to the site of an emergency to facilitate communication and co-operation between the government and local responders.
Hazard		Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e. non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or to economic, social and political structures.
Horizon scanning		The systematic search across the global environment for potential threats and hazards in order to inform better preparedness and decision-making.
Impact		The scale of the consequences of a hazard, threat or emergency expressed in terms of a reduction in human welfare, damage to the environment and loss of security.
Incident		An event that can be, or could lead to, a disruption, loss, emergency or crisis.
Lead Government Department	LGD	The designated department with national level responsibility for leading work to identify serious risks and ensuring that the right planning, response and recovery arrangements are in place.
Liaison Officer	LO	A liaison officer is a person who liaises between two or more organisations to communicate and coordinate their activities on a matter of mutual concern.
Local resilience forum	LRF	Process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a police force area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act.
Malicious Risk		Risks characterised by deliberate human intent to cause harm or disruption. These risks can come from individuals, groups or states. Examples include: terrorism, serious and organised crime, and hostile activity by foreign states.
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities	MACA	Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to Defence ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event.
Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government Resilience and Recovery Directorate	MHCLG RED	Act as a conduit for communications between central government and the local level. They are responsible for supporting local response and recovery efforts, and ensuring that there is an accurate picture of the situation in their area.
Mitigation		Limitation of any negative consequence of a particular incident.
National Security Risk Assessment	NSRA	The NSRA identifies, assesses and compares the most serious risks facing the UK, focusing on both likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact it would have, were it to happen. It is the principal tool for assessing the most serious civil contingencies risks facing the UK.
National Situation Centre	SitCen	The National Situation Centre brings together data, insights and expertise from across and beyond government to provide situational awareness to ministers and seniors during crisis preparedness and response. It provides 24/7 cover for reporting against all NSRA risks, from civil contingencies to national security.
National Security Watchkeepers	NS Watchkeepers	24/7 duty team monitoring for and alerting on crises and emergencies, in the UK and internationally. They are normally the first point of contact for any out-of-hours queries for COBR Unit and National Situation Centre. The NS Watchkeepers also produce the Daily Sitrep of global and domestic updates sent every morning across government.
Non-malicious risk		Risks characterised by natural or accidental causes. Examples include: industrial accidents, extreme weather, and human and animal disease.
Onset		Beginning of the impact of an incident or emergency.
Operational (Bronze)		The level (below tactical level) at which specific actions are delivered within the tactical plan to achieve strategic objectives.
Operations Cell (COBR Response Structure)	Ops Cell	A cell responsible for supporting the Chief of Staff to deliver the response. They ensure the right people are in the right place, at the right time, with the right information to make decisions.
Planning assumptions	PA	Descriptions of the types and scales of consequences for which organisations should be prepared to respond. These will be informed by the risk assessment process.
Policy Cell (COBR Response Structure)		A cell responsible for the commissioning of COBR papers, clarifying tasking and ensuring that papers, recommendations or actions required for COBR are delivered in good time.
Prevention		Measures that enable an organisation to avoid, preclude or limit the impact of an undesirable event or potential disruption.
Rapid onset emergency		Emergency which develops quickly, and usually with immediate effects, thereby limiting the time available to consider response options (in contrast to rising tide emergency).
Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario	RWCS	A tool used for planning purposes to illustrate the worst manifestation of a risk that can reasonably be expected potentially to occur based on current information and data.
Recovery		The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.
Recovery Co-ordinating Group	RCG	Local strategic decision-making body for the recovery phase.
Recovery Group	RG	A ministerial governance structure that will oversee recovery activity in England co-ordinating activity as appropriate with the devolved governments.
Recovery Liaison Officer		An advisor who sits in MHCLG RED and works with local areas and LRFs on recovery.
Red teaming		The independent application of a range of structured, creative and critical thinking techniques to assist the end user make a better-informed decision or produce a more robust product.
Reserved matter		Policy areas that are not within the competence of the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Response		The decisions and actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. At a high level this will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality.
Response Co-ordinating Group	(ResCG)	A Multi-SCG Co-ordinating Group which may be convened where the local response has been, or may be, overwhelmed and wider support is required, or where an emergency affects a number of neighbouring Strategic Co-ordinating Groups and would benefit from co-ordination (e.g. to obtain a consistent, structured approach) or enhanced support.
Response Reserve		A pool of volunteers, trained in key elements of crisis management, who can be deployed into crisis response where required.
Rising tide emergency		An event or situation with a lead in time of days, weeks or even months.
Risk		An event, person or object which could cause loss of life or injury, damage to infrastructure, social and economic disruption or environment degradation. The severity of a risk is assessed as a combination of its potential impact and its likelihood. The government subdivides risks into hazards and threats.
Risk assessment		A structured and auditable process of identifying potentially significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and action.
Rolling crisis		A crisis characterised by recurring phases of emergence and stabilisation over an extended period of time.
Scottish Government Resilience Room	SGORR	The Scottish Government’s central co-ordination mechanism for responding to civil contingencies emergencies.
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies	SAGE	An advisory group convened to provide independent scientific advice to support decision-making in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) in the event of a national emergency.
Situational Cell (COBR Response Team)	SitCell	A cell within the COBR Response Team which is responsible for developing and maintaining an overview of the crisis through the Commonly Recognised Information Picture (CRIP) which is produced in support of a COBR(O) or a COBR(M).
Situational awareness		The state of individual and/or collective knowledge relating to past and current events, their implications and potential future developments.
Situation report	SitRep	A report outlining the current state and potential development of an incident/emergency and the response to it.
Stand down		The process of moving out of a crisis response and standing down accompanying structures.
Strategic (Gold)		The level (above tactical level and operational level) at which policy, strategy and the overall response framework are established and managed.
Strategic Co-ordinating Group	SCG	Multi-agency body responsible for co-ordinating the joint response to an emergency at the local strategic level.
Subsidiarity		The principle by which decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level.
Surge capacity		The ability to surge staff who are working on non-critical projects from one part of the organisation to another to support a crisis response.
Tactical (Silver)		Level (below strategic level and above operational level) at which the response to an emergency is managed
Tactical Co-ordinating Group		A multi-agency group of tactical commanders that meets to determine, co-ordinate and deliver the tactical response to an emergency.
Territorial office	TO	Each devolved territory has its own department, responsible for liaising between the UK government and the relevant territory.
Threat		Malicious risks such as acts of terrorism, hostile state activity and cybercrime.
Validate		Measures to ensure that plans, procedures and other emergency response measures meet the purpose for which they were designed.
Value for money	VfM	The process under which organisation’s procurement, projects and processes are systematically evaluated and assessed to provide confidence about suitability, effectiveness, prudence, quality, value and avoidance of error and other waste, judged for the Exchequer as a whole.
Visual briefing aid	VBA	A product produced by the National Situation Centre that includes data and other sources to provide wider contextual awareness of a centrally-managed crisis.

Bibliography

Cabinet Office

• Civil Contingencies Act 2004
• Devolution: Guidance for civil servants
• Emergency preparedness
• Emergency Response and Recovery
• Exercising Best Practice Guidance
• List of Cabinet Committees
• Ministerial Code
• Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) Guidance
• The Cabinet Manual
• The Roles of Lead Government Departments, Devolved governments and other Public Bodies
• UK National Leadership for Risk Identification, Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery

HM Government

• Equalities Act 2010
• Government Communication Service: Crisis Communications Operating Model
• National Risk Register

HM Treasury

• Accounting officer assessments guidance (PDF, 357KB)
• Managing Public Money (PDF, 1,289KB)
• The Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts
• Risk Control Framework ‘Bank of Questions’ (XLSX, 1.95MB)

Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles

• Joint Doctrine - The Interoperability Framework July 2016 (PDF, 3.2MB)

Ministry of Defence

• Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience (PDF, 4.1MB)
• The Good Operation: A handbook for those involved in operational policy and its implementation
• Red Teaming Handbook

Office for National Statistics

• Data sharing for national crisis response

UK Resilience Academy

• Exercising Best Practice Guidance
• Lessons Management Best Practice Guidance
• Organisational Resilience Guidance for UK Government Departments, Agencies and Arm’s Length Bodies

1. Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Preparedness’, 2013 ↩

2. Scotland and Northern Ireland do not use the term local resilience forums, and instead use local resilience partnerships in Scotland and emergency preparedness groups in Northern Ireland. ↩

3. Cabinet Office, ‘Crisis Communications: Operating Model’, 2023 ↩

4. Cabinet Office, ‘UK National Leadership for Risk Identification, Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery’, 2023 ↩

5. Cabinet Office, ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’, 2013 ↩

6. Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Review of Intergovernmental Relations’, 2022 ↩

7. Cabinet Office, ‘Devolution: memorandum of understanding and supplementary agreement’, 2012 ↩

8. Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Office of the Secretary of State for Wales, Northern Ireland Office, Cabinet Office, ‘Guidance on devolution’, 2020 ↩

9. Appendix F includes further information on civil contingency arrangements in the devolved governments. ↩

10. Ministry of Defence, ‘UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience (JDP 02)’, 2012, ↩